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I. INTRODUCTION
The child welfare system in Canada has had a devastating and tragic
impact on First Nations.1 From the time provincial child welfare
schemes were first extended to First Nations on reserves in the late
1950s, large numbers of First Nations children have been removed from
their natural parents, their extended families, and their communities
This has had destructive effects on individual children and their
extended families.3 The continuous removal of children has also
1 1 use the term "First Nations" throughout this work to refer to those who are descendants of
peoples indigenous to the territory now called Canada, including: First Nations (e.g., Haida, Tlinkit,
Mohawk), M~tis, and Inuit. The term "Indian" is used in its legal sense to mean a person who falls
within the criteria established in thelndianAct R.S.C. 1985, c. I-5 [hereinafter Indian Act].
2 See statistics discussed infra, section II, notes 46-56 and accompanying text.
3 The most serious concern about First Nations children who are apprehended and placed in
the care of non-First Nations families is that they tend to lose their "language, identity and culture":
S. Bull, "The Special Case of the Native Child" (1989) 47 Advocate 523 at 530. However, racism in
the dominant society tends to limit the extent to which these children become assimilated. As a
result, they are much more likely than other children to experience "negative adjustment
outcomes," including a greater susceptibility to serious identity crises upon reaching adolescence:
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hindered the transmission of First Nations culture and traditions from
elders to younger generations, thus threatening the very survival of First
Nations.4 Such effects have long been known to First Nations,5 and
several studies have demonstrated empirically that vastly
disproportionate numbers of First Nations children end up in the
custody of child welfare authorities. 6 As well, highly publicized tragedies
see, e.g., P. Hudson & B. McKenzie, "Child Welfare and Native People: The Extension of
Colonialism" (1981) 49 Soc. Worker 63 at 64; Ontario Native Women's Association, Ontario
Federation of Indian Friendship Centres & Ontario Mdtis and Non-Status Indian Association,
Remove the Child and the Circle is Broken. A Response to the Proposed Children's Act Consultation
Paper (Toronto: Ontario Native Women's Association, Ontario Federation of Indian Friendship
Centres & Ontario M6tis and Non-Status Indian Association, 1983) at 18 [hereinafter Remove the
Child]; T. Sullivan, "Native Children in Treatment: Clinical, Social and Cultural Issues" (1983) 1:4
J. Child Care 75 at 78; S.G. Novosedlik, "Native Children White Law" (1983) 6:3 Perception 27; C.
Stuart, "Cross-Cultural Treatment for Native Children: A Point From Which to Begin" (1983) 1:5
J. Child Care 33; and B. Raychaba, To Be On Our Own With No Direction From Home: A Report on
the Special Needs of Youth Leaving the Care of the Child Welfare System (National Youth in Care
Network, 1988). See also W. Warry, Ontario's First People: Native Children (Toronto: The
Research Policy Nexus: Children, Families, and Public Policy in the 90s, 1989) at 27 (emotional
effects on extended family).
4 Remove the Child ibid. at 17. See also E.F. Carasco, "Canadian Native Children: Have
Child Welfare Laws Broken the Circle?" (1986) 5 Can. J. Faro. L. 111 at 115; and J.A. MacDonald,
"The Programme of the Spailumcheen Indian Band in British Columbia as a Model of Indian Child
Welfare" in J.S. Ismael & RJ. Thomlison, eds, Perspectives on Social Services and Social Issues
(Ottawa: Canadian Council on Social Development, 1987) 237 at 238. As a result, the removal of
children by the child welfare system has been characterized as genocide by many First Nations
commentators and others: see, e.g., British Columbia Native Women's Society as quoted in P.
Johnston, Native Children and the Child Welfare System (Ottawa: Canadian Council on Social
Development and James Lorimer & Company, 1983) at 62; P.A. Monture, "A Vicious Circle: Child
Welfare Law and the First Nations" (1989-90) 3 C.J.W.L. 1 at 7; Review Committee on Indian and
Mdtis Adoptions and Placements, No Quiet Place: Final Report to the Honourable Muriel Smith,
Minister of Community Services (Winnipeg: Manitoba Community Services, 1985) at 272 (Chair:
Kimelman A.C.J.) [hereinafter No Quiet Place]; and Hudson & McKenzie, supra, note 3 at 64.
5 See, eg., Remove the Chil4 supra, note 3 at 3.
6 H.P. Hepworth, Foster Care and Adoption in Canada (Ottawa: Canadian Council on Social
Development, 1980); P. Johnston, supra, note 4; and Canada, Child and Family Services Task Force,
Indian Child and Family Services in Canada: Final Report (Ottawa: Indian and Northern Affairs,
1987) [hereinafter Final Report]. For a more detailed consideration of this data, see infra, notes 48-
56 and accompanying text. More recently, various provinces have collected and reported their own
data: see, e.g., British Columbia, An Overview of Family & Children's Services 1990/1991 (Victoria:
Ministry of Social Services, 1992).
Prior to these studies, the struggle of First Nations with the child welfare system had not gone
entirely unnoticed by the dominant society: see H.B. Hawthorn, ed., A Survey of the Contemporary
Indians of Canada: A Report on Economic, Politica4 Educational Needs and Policies (Ottawa:
Indian Affairs Branch, 1966) vol. 1 at 327; D. Sanders, Family Law and Native People: Background
Paper (Ottawa: Law Reform Commission of Canada, 1975); British Columbia, The Tenth Report of
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in the last decade involving the death of First Nations children receiving
foster care in non-First Nations homes have underlined the impact of
the child welfare system on First Nations, and have raised questions
about the system's legitimacy.7
Different approaches have been taken in analyzing the adverse
impact of the child welfare system on First Nations. Some
commentators attribute the high proportion of First Nations children in
care to inadequate parenting and child neglect which, in turn, are
understood as resulting from the difficult socio-economic conditions in
which many First Nations people live.8 Others blame over-zealous child
welfare authorities who apply culturally biased structures and values in
the Royal Commission on Family and Children's Law: Native Families and the Law (Vancouver:
Queen's Printer, May 1973) (Chair: T.R. Berger); Canadian Council on Children and Youth,
Admittance Restricted- The Child as Citizen in Canada (Ottawa: Canadian Council on Children and
Youth, 1978); Canada, Indian Self-Government in Canada: Report of the Special Committee (Ottawa:
Queen's Printer, 1983); and No Quiet Place, supra, note 4.
7 For example, Re: Cameron Kerley (date of death: 1983), see Monture, supra, note 4 at 1,
and C. Cuihane, "Isn't it time to give this young native a break" (1986) Can. H.R. Advoc. 11. Re:
Richard Cardinal (date of death: 1984), see Indian Association of Alberta, Child Welfare Needs:
Assessment and Recommendations (Calgary: Indian Association of Alberta, 1987) at 6 [hereinafter
Child Welfare Needs], and C. Chartier, In the Best Interest of the Metis Child (Saskatoon: University
of Saskatchewan Native Law Centre, 1988) at 67. Re: Marion Pippin (date of death: 1989), see G.
York, "Teen-ager's Death Seen As Tragic Proof of Need for Native Social Workers" The [Toronto]
Globe and Mail (24 April 1989) Al; and "Police Shooting of Indian Sparks Call for Inquiry" The
[Toronto] Globe and Mail (18 April 1989) A3. See, generally, G. York, The Dispossessed: Life and
Death in Native Canada, 1st ed. (Toronto: Lester & Orpen Dennys, 1989) c. 8.
8 As discussed in Johnston, supra, note 4, and Warry, supra, note 3. Poverty is certainly an
important factor contributing to the high incidence of First Nations children in protective care.
Poor people not only have difficulty paying for necessary dayeare and babysitting services, but they
are subject to much greater public scrutiny because of their dependence on other social services
such as social assistance: F. Stairs, Women and the Child Welfare System (Osgoode Hall Law
School, York University, 1989) [unpublished]; and L. Gordon, Heroes of Their Own Lives: The
Politics and History of Family Violence, Boston 1880-1960 (New York: Viking, 1988). This model of
child abuse and neglect, however, usually emphasizes individual pathology and ignores broader
sociological and historical causes of child abuse and neglect: Warry, supra, note 3 at 27. The
poverty of First Nations, for example, must be understood as itself a product of the colonialist
history of white/First Nations relations which has resulted, among other things, in the destruction of
traditional First Nation economies. First Nations poverty is also further exacerbated by the lack of
adequate preventive and support services in many First Nations communities that results from
ongoing jurisdictional disputes between the federal and provincial governments respecting child
welfare services for status Indians: K. McNeil, R. Thompson & C. Bell, Indian Child Welfare:
Whose Responsibility? (Saskatoon: University of Saskatchewan Native Law Centre, 1981, updated
1984); Monture, supra, note 4 at 8-11; Johnston, supra, note 4; and B.A. Atwood, "Fighting Over
Indian Children: The Uses and Abuses of Jurisdictional Ambiguity" (1989) 36 UCLA L Rev. 1051
(U.S. context).
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their effort to "help" First Nations children.9 Still other commentators
link the operation of the child welfare system to the continuing processes
of colonialization" in Canada. 11 For these commentators, focusing only
9 This is understood to play out, for example, in the determination of suitable child-care
practices and providers: see Carasco, supra, note 4 at 131; Johnston, supra, note 4 at 68; and
Novosedlik, supra, note 3 at 29. See also Sullivan, supra, note 3 at 78.
10 The term "colonialism" is widely used in the literature discussing the impact of European
economic development and settlement on the indigenous peoples of North America, yet it is seldom
defined. The situation is further complicated by the extensive conflation of the terms "colonialism"
and "colonization": see, eg., J.S. Frideres, Native Peoples in Canada: Contemporary Conflicts, 3d ed.
(Scarborough, Ont.: Prentice-Hall, 1988) at 367; G. Kellough, "From Colonialism to Economic
Imperialism: The Experience of the Canadian Indian" in J. Harp & J.R. Hofley, eds, Structured
Inequality in Canada (Scarborough, Ont.: Prentice-Hall, 1980) 343 at 343 n. 1 and at 347; R.F.
Berkhofer, The White Man's Indian: Images of the American Indian from Columbus to the Present
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978) at 123. An early attempt at a general definition of colonialism
can be found in R.J. Horvath, "A Definition of Colonialism" (1972) 13 Curt. Anthropology 45. See
also the classic consideration of colonizer/colonized relations by A. Memmi, The Colonizer and the
Colonized (Boston: Beacon Press, 1965). More recent attempts at defining the processes involved
in colonialism and/or colonization include: M. Etienne & E. Leacock, "Introduction" in M. Etienne
& E. Leacock, eds, Women and Colonization: Anthropological Perspectives (New York: Praeger,
1980) at 17 (arguing that each case of colonization is unique depending on the interplay of "the part-
icular mode of colonization, itself determined by the political and economic imperatives of the
colonizer and by the nature of the colonized society, the precise strategies of exploitation employed
by the colonizer; and the strategies of accommodation or resistance adopted by the colonized.");
E.E. Cashmore, Dictionary of Race and Ethnic Relations (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1984)
at 53-56 (defining colonialism at 53 as "the domination of one group over ... others, culturally un-
related groups which lived in distant territories and had few defences against the conquering
powers" and at 55 identifying the process as operating "at many levels, crucially at the level of con-
sciousness." Colonization, in contrast, is defined at 54 as "the process of taking the lands and re-
sources for exploitation."); B.B. Ringer, "We the People" and Others: Duality and America's
Treatment of its Racial Minorities (New York: Tavistock, 1983) at 7-9 (distinguishing colonization
and colonialization as two related, yet distinct processes which have resulted in New World societies
of a dualistic nature. As colonists, Ringer argues at 7 that "the English created a society whose in-
stitutions were molded in their racial, religious, and national image." Colonization, in other words,
refers only to the society created by and for whites. As colonialists, on the other hand, "the English
subjected the nonwhites with whom they came into contact to violence, force, and fraud; and they
subjugated, killed, or drove them off": at 8. The normative environment of the colonialist society, in
other words, was racially bifurcated and "defined by a racial creed which stressed the separateness
of the races and the inferiority of the nonwhite." Ibid. The inter-connections between these two
processes are developed in Ringer's subsequent argument at 9 that "America's historic treatment of
its racial minorities has been both an expression and product of the dialectical tension and struggle
between these two models."); R.E. Bourgeault, "Race and Class Under Mercantilism: Indigenous
People in Nineteenth-Century Canada" in B.S. Bolaria & P.S. Li, eds, Racial Oppression in Canada,
2d ed. (Toronto: Garamond, 1988) 41 at 56 (arguing that the "intent of British colonial policy [in
nineteenth century Canada] was to create a white colony with political power and re-presentation in
the hands of whites."); Frideres, supra at 366-72 (developing a "theoretical model" of white/First
Nations relations in Canada referred to as "colonialism" by sketching the process of colonization as
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on socio-economic factors or social work practices provides a limited
and incomplete understanding of the problem. They argue that it is
necessary to go beyond these factors and situate child welfare policy and
practice in the historical context of the domination of First Nations in
Canada by European-based political, legal, and economic systems.
Important to such analyses is the question of how law operates in the
context of the child welfare system as it applies to First Nations.
Emily Carasco and Patricia Monture have recently addressed this
question.1 2 Carasco examines child welfare cases from across the
country and concludes that "the best interests of the Indian child have
not been hitherto protected because of a general failure to give
appropriate consideration to the 'indigenous factor'. s13 Monture takes
Carasco's analysis further by situating the devaluation of the "indigenous
factor" in child welfare cases within the more general context of
structures of racism within law. Her analysis focuses on the "manner [in]
which racism is constituted and implemented within legal structures. '14
She argues that child welfare law is racist in that it applies standards
"which are not culturally relevant" to First Nations and that merely
involving seven different aspects).
In this article, I use the terms "colonialism" and "colonialization" to refer to the processes of
European domination of the First Nations in Canada following the spirit of the analyses of
Kellough, supra; E.P. Patterson, The Canadian Indian: A History Since 1500 (Don Mills, Ont.:
Collier-MacMillan, 1972) c. 1; and Frideres, supra. To avoid confusion, I refrain from using the
term colonization except when referring to the process of the establishment of European colonies in
the territory now referred to as Canada.
11 Hudson & McKenzie, supra, note 3. See also Native People's Resource Centre, B. Loucks
& A. Timothy, Justice-Related Children and Family Services for Native People in Ontario: A
Discussion Paper, rev'd ed. (Toronto: Ontario Native Council on Justice, 1981); and H. Cardinal,
The Unjust Society: The Tragedy of Canada's Indians (Edmonton: M.G. Hurtig, 1969).
12 Carasco, supra, note 4 at 115; and Monture, supra, note 4 at 7-8. Others who consider the
operation of law in the context of First Nations child welfare include: A. McGillivray, "Transracial
Adoption and the Status Indian Child" (1985) 4 Can. J. Fain. L. 437; Bull, supra, note 3; Novosedlik,
supra, note 3; and Chartier, supra, note 7. For those who focus on analyzing federal/provincial
jurisdictional disputes, see McNeil et a4 Monture, Johnston, & Atwood, supra, note 8. For an
analysis of the various legal mechanisms available for arranging the provision of First Nations child
welfare services, see D.R. James, "Legal Structures for Organizing Indian Child Welfare
Resources," [1987] 2 C.N.L.R. 1.
13 Supra, note 3 at 115. Carasco defines the "indigenous factor" as "the disregarded,
underemphasized or undervalued factor in child welfare situations involving Indian children." Ibid.
at 113. For similar analyses, see Bull, supra, note 3 at 525 and 530; and Novosedlik, supra, note 3.
14 Monture, supra, note 4 at 8 n. 29.
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"reinforce the status quo."15 In her view, "fundamental[ly] racist notions
... underpin"'16 judicial interpretations of, for example, the "best interests
of the child" test.17
My aim in this article is to deepen and complicate this analysis of
racist structures in child welfare law by locating such structures
historically and ideologically. I will focus my analysis on the courts
because their role in First Nations child welfare matters is substantial.
Recent data demonstrate that provincial child welfare authorities have
tended to rely upon court orders to apprehend First Nations children
rather than on the provision of supportive or foster care services to
families on a voluntary basis 18 As well, courts have final authority under
legislation to determine whether, and in what form and duration, a child
should be placed into protective care once apprehended.
I will argue that child welfare law has provided a new modality of
colonialist regulation of First Nations in the post-Second World War
period. This argument will be developed in two stages. First, I will
consider the historical convergence of factors that have led to the
extension of child welfare law and services to First Nations on reserves.
Second, I will argue that a key to understanding the devastating impact
of the child welfare system on First Nations lies in the ideological.
dimensions of child welfare law.19 In this article, I will focus on the
ideologicalforn of child welfare law and, in particular, that of its central
legal concept-the "best interests of the child." 20  The historical
15 ibid. at 12.
16 bid. at 8 n. 29.
1 7 Ibid. at 12. See infra, note 57 and accompanying text for further consideration of the
centrality of the best interests of the child standard to child welfare law.
18 Final Repor4 supra, note 6 at 8-9. I place voluntary in italics to indicate that parents, and, in
most cases, mothers or female extended family members may be pressured by child welfare
authorities into accepting often culturally inappropriate support services by an unspoken threat that
court proceedings will be initiated and their children apprehended if they refuse to co-operate. See
Stairs, supra, note 8.
19 See infra, notes 58-60, 78-81, and accompanying text for further consideration of the
concept of ideology.
20 In a subsequent, as yet unpublished, paper, I will examine another ideological dimension of
child welfare law, namely how ideological thought about First Nations that is formally external to
law is relied upon by judges in their decision making: see infira, note 60. I have separated
consideration of these two types of relations between law and ideology for analytic and illustrative
purposes. In actual practice, the two processes are interdependent and mutually reinforcing.
19921
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development of best interests ideology will be situated in the context of
nineteenth century developments in the ideology of childhood and the
role of the state in protecting children. I will then consider how best
interests ideology is infused with the basic tenets of liberal
legality-individualism, abstraction, universalism, and impartiality-and
show how this helps to explain judicial reasoning and results in First
Nations child welfare cases. Finally, I will examine the impact of best
interests ideology on recent legislative reform efforts in the area of First
Nations child welfare.
II. THE EXTENSION OF CHILD WELFARE LAW TO FIRST
NATIONS: A NEW MODALITY OF COLONIALIST
REGULATION
Child welfare services were not extended to reserves until after
the Second World War. The latter part of the 1940s marked the
beginning of a significant re-examination of government policies relating
to First Nations. The aggressive assimilationist policies of earlier eras21
came under attack,22 and debates about First Nations policy were
21 Beginning around the 1830s in the eastern third of the territory now called Canada,
aggressive, assimilationist state policies were developed and instituted which consisted of three main
components-reserve systems, political wardship, and residential schools-orchestrated by a
complex framework of legislative and administrative structures: see, e.g., A. Tanner, "Introduction:
Canadian Indians and the Politics of Dependency" in A. Tanner, ed., The Politics of Indianness:
Case Studies of Native Ethnopolitics in Canada (St. John's: Institute of Social and Economic
Research, Memorial University of Newfoundland, 1983) 1; Frideres, supra, note 10; J.S. Frideres,
"Policies On Indian People in Canada" in P.S. Li, ed., Race and Ethnic Relations in Canada
(Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1990) 98; J.R. Miller, Skyscrapers Hide the Heavens: A History of
Indian-White Relations in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989); S.M. Weaver,
"Segregation and the Indian Act: The Dialogue of Equality vs. Special Status" in W. Isajiw, ed.,
Identities: The Impact of Ethnicity on Canadian Society (Toronto: Peter Martin Associates, 1977)
154; R. Gibbons & J.R. Ponting, "Historical Overview and Background" in J.R. Ponting, ed.,
Arduous Journey: Canadian Indians and Decolonization (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1986)
18; J.L. Tobias, "Protection, Civilization, Assimilation: An Outline History of Canada's Indian
Policy" in I.A.L. Getty & A.S. Lussier, eds, As LongAs the Sun Shines and Water Flows: A Reader in
Canadian Native Studies (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1983) 39; Kellough,
supra, note 10; RFisher, Contact and Conflict: Indian-European Relations in British Columbia, 1774-
1890 (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1977); and C. Haig-Brown, Resistance and
RenewaL Surviving the Indian Residential School (Vancouver: Tillacum Library, 1988).
22 By this time, Ottawa bureaucrats and missionary groups alike could no longer ignore the
fact that assimilation and economic development on reserves were not taking place as expected.
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increasingly informed by emerging liberal democratic ideologies and
discourses. 23 The previous treatment of First Nations as separate from,
and inferior to, the dominant Anglo-Canadian culture was challenged by
a new concern that First Nations be treated as equals, in particular, by
integrating them into developing universal social programs? 4 In this
context, a Special Joint Committee of the Senate and House of
Commons was appointed in 1946 to "examine and consider" the Indian
Act and to suggest amendments thereto, with specific terms of reference
to include investigation of "any ... matter or thing pertaining to the social
and economic status of Indians and their advancement. '25 The Joint
Committee sat for three consecutive sessions of Parliament, but only
reluctantly began to hear from First Nations constituencies in the middle
of the second session after the committee's credibility was called into
question over the issue of First Nations representation 2 6
The committee's most significant recommendation was that
financial arrangements be developed to integrate Indians into provincial
The rise of organized political protest on the part of the First Nations during this period was
another important factor contributing to this shift in attitude: Tobias, supra, note 21 at 48.
2 3 See P. Havemann, "Law, State, and Canada's Indigenous People: Pacification by Coercion
and Consent" in T. Caputo et aL, eds, Law and Society: A Critical Perspective (Toronto: Harcourt
Brace Javanovich, 1989) 54. Some of this was the result of a "new social awareness" on the part of
the Canadian public and policy makers that had its origins in the war experience. See P. Tennant,
Aboriginal Peoples and Politics: The Indian Land Question in British Columbia,' 1849-1989
(Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1990) at 122; Miller, supra, note 21 at 220; and
Treaties and Historical Research Centre, The Historical Development of the Indian Act, 2d ed.
(Ottawa: Treaties & Historical Research Centre, P.R.E. Group, Indian and Northern Affairs, 1978)
at 133.
24 For consideration of the development of universal social programs in Canada during the
post-Second World War period, see, eg., D. Guest, The Emergence of Social Security in Canada
(Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1980); A. Finkel, "Origins of the Welfare State
in Canada" in L. Panitch, ed., The Canadian State: Political Economy and Political Power (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1977) 344; G. Drover & A. Moscovitch, "Inequality and Social
Welfare" in A. Moscovitch & G. Drover, eds, Inequality: Essays on the Political Economy of Social
Welfare (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981) 1; H. Buchbinder, "Inequality and the Social
Services" in Moscovitch & Drover, supra, 348; and A.W. Djao, Inequality and Social Policy: The
Sociology of Welfare (Toronto: John Wiley & Sons, 1983).
25 As set out in Treaties and Historical Research Centre, supra, note 23 at 132. See Tobias,
supra, note 21 at 51-52 for an analysis of the specific factors which gave rise to the appointment of
the Special Joint Committee.
2 6 I.V.B. Johnson, Helping Indians to Help Themselves-A Committee to Investigate Itself. The
1951 Indian Act Consultation Process (Ottawa: Treaties and Historical Research Centre and Indian
and Northern Affairs Canada, 1984) at 25-26.
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health, education, and social service programs.27 As in previous years,
assimilation of Indians continued to be an important theme in
discussions leading to this recommendation, but assimilation was now
presented in terms of granting Indians rights equal to those of other
Canadians and doing away with their special status.28 In the end, the
committee recommended extension of provincial social services, the goal
being "economic assimilation of Indians into the body politic."29 The
government responded to the Report of the Joint Committee by tabling
amendments to the Indian Act.30 To distinguish its new initiatives
premised on equal status from earlier state policies of assimilation
premised on segregation and inferior status, the government attempted
to construct a new official discourse of "integration."31
2 7 Treaties and Historical Research Centre, supra, note 23 at 144; and Johnson, supra, note 26
at 47. Such extensions of services had been advocated in the submissions of some First Nations
organizations, Canada, Special Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons
Appointed to Examine and Consider the Indian Act, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence (Ottawa:
King's Printer, 13 May 1946) at 614, 858; and in a joint brief submitted by the Canadian Welfare
Council and the Canadian Association of Social Workers: Canada, Canadian Welfare Council and
Canadian Association of Social Workers, Joint Submission to the Special Joint Committee of the
Senate and the House of Commons Appointed to Examine and Consider the Indian Act, Special
Joint Committee Appointed to Examine and Consider the Indian Act, Minutes of Proceedings and
Evidence 1947, app. 30 (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1946-49) at 160-61 [hereinafter Joint Submission].
28 D.E. Ginn, Aboriginal Self-Government (LL.M. Thesis, Osgoode Hall Law School, York
University, 1987) at 19 [unpublished]. This is in contrast to old policies which emphasized
segregation as a means to "train" First Nations for assimilation: see, eg., D. Sanders, "Prior Claims:
Aboriginal People in the Constitution of Canada" in S.M. Beck & I. Bernier, eds, Canada and the
New Constitution: The UnfinishedAgenda, vol. 1 (Montreal: Institute for Research on Public Policy,
1983) 225; and Tanner, supra, note 21 at 16. For example, anthropologist Diamond Jenness
introduced his "Plan for Liquidating Canada's Indian Problem Within 25 Years" with the goal "[t]o
abolish, gradually but rapidly, the separate political and social status of Indians (and Eskimos); to
enfranchise them and merge them into the rest of the population on an equal footing": Canada,
Special Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons Appointed to Examine and
Consider the Indian Act, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, app. 30 (Ottawa: King's Printer, 25
March 1947) at 310-11 [hereinafter S.C. Minutes and Proceedings].
29 S.jC Minutes and Proceedings, ibid. 1948 at 189 cited in Treaties and Historical Research
Centre, supra, note 23 at 144. See also Johnson, supra, note 26 at 47.
30 1ndianAct, RtS.C. 1952, c. 149 [hereinafter IndianAc4 1952].
31 In introducing the amended Indian Act (Bill No. 79, An Act Respecting Indians, 4th Sess.,
21 st. Parl., 1951) for second reading in the House of Commons, for example, W.E. Harris, the
Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, attempted to distinguish between the new policy of
"integration" and earlier government policies of "assimilation." After reasserting a statement which
he had made earlier in the legislative process that "it was hoped that we could eventually provide for
the integration of the Indian into our community life," he said that he had "received many protests
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The amendments did not represent a significant structural
transformation in government policies towards First Nations,32 though
they did provide a legislative framework which supported and facilitated
new modalities of colonialist regulation of First Nations in the ensuing
years, most significantly through the application of child welfare law.33
A new section was added to the Indian Act providing that "all laws of
general application ... in force in any province are applicable ... except to
the extent that such laws are inconsistent with this Act."3 4 This section
was regarded as a necessary precursor to the extension of child welfare
services to First Nations. Following the section's enactment, the Indian
Affairs Branch and some provincial government officials interpreted it
as providing that provincial child welfare laws were applicable to First
Nations peoples on reserves 35 At least in theory, then, there were no
longer legal impediments to the extension of provincial child welfare
services to First Nations.36
In practice, however, the extension of child welfare services to
First Nations was not immediately forthcoming. The federal
government took the position that it "lacked the authority and capacity
to ensure the availability of adequate child welfare services for bands
directly" and sought to "arrange for the extension of existing provincial
from Indians with respect to that statement because there were many who thought that integration
was equivalent to assimilation." In response, he argued "that ... [was] not the meaning of the word
in any way; the word was used to indicate the status of having privileges, duties and responsibilities
equal to those of other Canadians, and exercising them in the same manner that we do." House of
Commons Debates (16 March 1951) at 1350. See also N. Dyck, "The Politics of Special Status:
Indian Association and the Administration of Indian Affairs" in J. Dahlie & T. Fernando, eds,
Ethnicity, Power and Politics in Canada (Toronto: Methuen, 1981) 279.
32 Though fifty sections representing "most provisions regarding aggressive assimilation" were
repealed by the new IndianAc 1952 "[t]he main elements of the earliest Dominion legislation ...
were preserved intact." Johnson, supra, note 26 at 51. See also Treaties and Historical Research
Centre, supra, note 23 at 149.
33 This notion of a "shift ... in the modality of ... regulation" is adopted from S. Hall,
"Reformism and the Legislation of Consent" in National Deviancy Conference, ed., Permissiveness
and Controk The Fate of the Sixties Legislation (Great Britain: MacMillan, 1980) 1 at 2.
34 IndianAc4 1952 s. 87.
35 See H.B. Hawthorn, C.S. Belshaw & S.M. Jamieson, The Indians of British Columbia: A
Study of Contemporary Social Adjustment (Toronto: University of Toronto Press & University of
British Columbia, 1960) at 399; A. Pratt, "Federalism in the Era of Aboriginal Self-Government" in
D.C. Hawkes, ed., Aboriginal Peoples and Government Responsibility: Exploring Federal and
ProvincialRoles (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1989) 19 at 31.
36 Though this was not firmly established until the Natural Parents case: see infra, note 84.
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services on reserves."37 According to the federal government, the new
amendment did not authorize additional federal funding to defray the
cost of newly provided services,38 and provincial service providers were
loathe to extend their already overburdened child welfare services to
First Nations without such funding.39 By 1956, only Ontario had entered
into an agreement with the federal government to extend provincial
children's aid services to reserves.40 As late as 1959, residential schools
were still the primary facility relied on by the Indian Affairs Branch to
provide child welfare-like services to First Nations.41 In 1961, a study of
the social work implications of the Indian Act described as "entirely
inadequate" the commitment of only nine social workers across the
country to work with the 179,000 residents of reserves. 42 By 1964, only
the Yukon, Nova Scotia, and several children's aid societies in Manitoba
had joined Ontario in entering into funding agreements with the federal
government.43
The uneven provision of child welfare services to First Nations
had not significantly improved in 1966 when a federal commission,
appointed to examine the social, educational, and economic situation of
Indians in Canada, concluded that "the situation [respecting the
provision of child welfare services to the First Nations in jurisdictions
with no federal/provincial cost-sharing agreements] varies from
unsatisfactory to appalling."'44 Nonetheless, the commission's report
hailed the limited extension of child welfare services as "one of the most
significant achievements in the elimination of discriminatory treatment
3 7 FinalReport, supra, note 6 at 3. See also Hawthorn, supra, note 6 at 327.
3 8 Johnston, supra, note 4 at 3.
39 A.I. Holmes, The Social Welfare Aspects and Implications of the Indian Act (M.S.W.
Thesis, University of British Columbia, 1961) at 61 [unpublished].
4 0 Holmes, ibid. at 60; and Hawthorn, supra, note 6 at 327.
41 Holmes, ibid. at 57; and Hawthorn, supra, note 6 at 399. But see also W.T. Stanbury, The
Social and Economic Conditions of Indian Families in British Columbia (Vancouver: British
Columbia Family and Children Law Commission, 1974) at 50 providing evidence that the Indian
Affairs Branch, at least in British Columbia, also placed Indian children in foster homes in the 1950s
and early 1960s.
42 Holmes, supra, note 39 at 60.
43 Hawthorn, supra, note 6 at 327.
44 /bid.
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between Indians and non-Indians in the field of welfare."45 Despite
these limitations, by the time of the report, significant numbers of First
Nations children had been brought into state care. In British Columbia,
for example, the number of First Nations children in care increased from
29 children in care in 1955 to 39 per cent of the total number in care in
1965.46
The introduction of the Canada Assistance Plan in 1966 allowed
for a significant expansion of provincial child welfare services by
providing federal cost-sharing to offset provincial costs.4 7 As a
consequence, the proportion of First Nations children in care began to
increase dramatically across the country. By 1977, almost 20 per cent
(15,500) of the total number of children in care in the country were First
Nations children.48 In the four western provinces, where First Nations
populations tend to be larger, the proportions were estimated to be
above the average: 39 per cent in British Columbia, 40 per cent in
Alberta, 50 per cent in Saskatchewan, and 60 per cent in Manitoba.49 In
particular locales, the percentage of apprehended children was even
higher. For example, in 1981 in the Kenora region of Ontario, 85 per
cent of children in care were First Nations children, although First
Nations people made up only 25 per cent of the local population.5 0
According to a 1980 study, status Indian children were placed into state
care at a rate of four and one-half times that of other Canadian
children.51  Altogether, in the last twenty-five years, vastly
45 Ibid at 328-29.
46 Union of British Columbia Indian Chiefs et aL, A Survey of Adoption and Child Welfare
Services to Indians of B.C (Vancouver: Department of Human Resources, 1974) at 5-6 [hereinafter
Survey of Adoption]. At the same time that Indian children were being brought increasingly into the
care of provincial authorities, those involved were concerned with the difficulty that they were
having in finding "suitable Indian foster homes." Hawthorn et aL, supra, note 35 at 399. See also
Survey ofAdoption, supra at 5.
4 7 H.P. Hepworth, "Trends in Provincial Social Service Department Expenditures, 1963-1982"
in J.S. Ismael, ed., Canadian Social Welfare Policy: Federal and Provincial Dimensions (Kingston,
Ont.: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1985) 139 at 140-41.
48 Hepworth, supra, note 6 at 111.
49 ibid. at 115.
5 0 Johnston, supra, note 4 at 44.
51 ibid. at 57.
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disproportionate numbers of First Nations children have ended up in the
custody of child welfare authorities.
Studies have also documented how First Nations children are
much less likely than other children to be returned to their own parents
or placed for adoption once admitted into care, and that, if placed in
foster homes, they are likely to be situated with non-First Nations
families.52 A 1987 report found that status Indian children were placed
into care predominantly outside their community and that they
remained in care longer than non-First Nations children. 53 Further,
status Indian children were more frequently moved out of care through
adoption or by being relinquished into their own custody at age eighteen
or nineteen, than through being returned to their familial home.54 With
respect to adoption, the total number of First Nations children adopted
by non-First Nations parents increased fivefold from the early 1960s to
the late 1970s. 55 From 1969 to 1979, an average of just over 78 per cent
of status Indian children placed for adoption each year were adopted by
non-First Nations families.56
III. CHILD WELFARE LAW AND ITS APPLICATION TO FIRST
NATIONS
The above discussion shows that, since the 1950s when provincial
child welfare schemes were first extended to First Nations people on
reserves, the system has had the effect of removing large numbers of
children from their natural parents, their extended families, and their
communities. The results of extension have been to further the
colonialization of First Nations and to erode their social and political
structures. In terms of these effects, child welfare law can be understood
as a new modality of colonialist regulation of First Nations, though one
less explicit and apparently more "innocent" of colonialist intentions
52 Hepworth, supra, note 6 at 118; and Johnston, supra, note 4 at 9.
5 3 FinalReport, supra, note 6 at 9.
54 Ibid.
55 Hepworth, supra, note 6 at 119; and Department of Indian and Inuit Affairs Program,
Indian Conditions: A Survey (Ottawa: Ministry of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, 1980)
at 24.
5 6 Hepworth, ibid. at 120. See also Stanbury, supra, note 41 at 57.
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than the aggressive mechanisms of the past. Canadian child welfare law
directs judges to make decisions that are "in the best interests of the
child."'57 Unlike earlier colonialist mechanisms that openly segregated
Indians and treated them as inferiors, the apprehension of First Nations
children from their communities and its negative effects are facilitated
and legitimated by a legal system that is based upon ideals of universality
and neutrality, and which purports to protect individual children and act
in their best interests. In other words, there are ideological dimensions
of child welfare law which make decisions arrived at within the system
appear natural, necessary, and legitimate, rather than coercive and
destructive.58 These dimensions can be investigated on two different
57 In most jurisdictions, the best interests test applies only in decisions relating to a child at the
dispositional stage after it has been determined according to specific statutory criteria that the child
is in need of protection. See Child Welfare Act, S.A. 1984, c. C-8.1, s. 2 [hereinafter Alberta Act
1984]; The Child and Family Services Act, S.M. 1985-86, c. 8, s. 2(1) [hereinafterManitobaAc 1985-
86]; and Re Greenland (1984), 50 Nfild & P.E.I.R. 193 (Nfld Unif. Fain. Ct). Some statutes explicitly
provide that the best interests of the child is to be the paramount consideration in any interpretation
or decision made pursuant to child welfare legislation: Alberta Ac 1984, s. 2; Manitoba Ac 1985-
86, s. 2(1); Child Welfare Act, R.S.N. 1990, c. C-12, s. 4(1) [hereinafter Newfoundland Ac4 1990];
Child and Family Services Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.11, s. 1(a) [hereinafter Ontario Act, 1990]; Family
and Child Services Act, R.S.P.E.I. 1988, c. F-2, s. 2 [hereinafter P.E.I. Act, 1988]; and Children and
Family Services Act, S.N.S. 1990, c. 5, s. 2(2) [hereinafter Nova Scotia Ac4 1990]. See also The Child
and Family Services Act, S.S. 1989-90, c. C-7.2, ss. 3-4 [hereinafter Saskatchewan Act, 1989-90]. Of
these, some statutes define the best interests of the child, either exhaustively or as an inexhaustive
list of considerations: see Manitoba Act, 1985-86, s. 2(1); Newfoundland Ac 1990, s. 4(2); Nova
Scotia Act, 1990, s. 3(2); Ontario Ac 1990, s. 37(3); P.E.I. Act 1988, s. 1(1)(d); and Saskatchewan
Act, 1989-90, s. 4. Other statutes establish no overriding best interests of the child principle or
specific, defining criteria, but make reference to the best interests of the child or similar terms in a
variety of provisions: see, e.g., Child Welfare Act, R.S.N.W.T. 1974, c. C-3, ss. 21(2), 26(1), 28(1). In
interpreting child welfare provisions, however, courts have generally regarded the best interests of
the child as an overriding factor: see, eg.,Racine v. Woods, [1983] 2 S.C.R. 173, [1984] 1 C.N.LR.
161 [hereinafter Racine, (S.C.C.) cited to S.C.R.]. Even in jurisdictions where the best interests
criterion is not legislatively established as overriding, the courts have nonetheless relied on their
inherentparenspatriae jurisdiction to establish it as such: see, eg., King v. Low, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 87
[hereinafter King]; and Alberta cases discussed infra, Section IV.
58 The works that have been particularly helpful to me in developing an understanding of the
concept of ideology are: D. Hay, "Property, Authority and the Criminal Law" in D. Hay et aL, eds,
Albion's Fatal Tree: Crime and Society in Eighteenth-Century England (New York: Pantheon Books,
1975) 17; R. Cotterreil, The Sociology of Law: An Introduction (London: Butterworths, 1984); M.
Barrett, Women's Oppression Today: Problems in Marxist Feminist Analysis (London: Verso, 1980);
A. Hunt, "The Ideology of Law: Advances and Problems in Recent Applications of the Concept of
Ideology to the Analysis of Law" (1985) 19 L. & Soc. Rev. 11; S. Hall et aL, Policing the Crisis:
Mugging, the State, and Law and Order (London: MacMillan Education, 1978); S. Hall, "The Toad
in the Garden: Thatcherism among the Theorists" in C. Nelson & L. Grossberg, eds, Marxism and
the Interpretation of Culture (Urbana, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1988) 35; S.A.M. Gavigan,
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levels. First, one can analyze the particular ideological form of the best
interests standard and explore how it has affected the interpretation and
application of this standard in the adjudication of First Nations child
welfare disputes.59 Second, one can look at how ideological thought
about First Nations that is formally external to law is relied upon by
judges in child welfare cases and thereby imported into, and reinforced
by, law.60 In this article, I will focus on the former kind of analysis.
A. "Best Interests of the Child" Ideology
The ideological form of the "best interests" legal standard in
child welfare law is a product of its historical development in the
material conditions of nineteenth and twentieth century Canada and
Europe. It is premised on liberal notions of law and childhood. Anglo-
Canadian law is liberal in form. It is individualistic and abstract, and it
claims to be impartial and universal in that all individuals are treated the
same without regard to their different social situations.61 These factors
support the appearance of Anglo-Canadian law as incompatible with
reproducing and reinforcing social relations of oppression and
inequality.62 There is, however, a substantial literature demonstrating
how the liberal form of law serves to obscure, and thereby legitimate and
reproduce, oppressive structures.63 In the context of racial oppression,
"Law, Gender and Ideology" in A. Bayefsky, ed., Legal Theory Meets Legal Practice (Edmonton:
Academic Printing and Publishing, 1988) 283; and T. Eagleton, Ideology: An Introduction (London:
Verso, 1991).
59 This is an investigation of the form of law which corresponds to the first of two
"coextensive" levels of inquiry required by the ideological analysis of law as described by Gavigan,
ibiaL at 292. Gavigan specifically identifies the best interests of the child principle as an example of
legal doctrine appropriate for this type of analysis.
60 This is what Gavigan characterizes as the second level of inquiry required by the ideological
analysis of law. lbid.
61 See, eg., S. Picciotto, "The Theory of the State, Class Struggle and the Rule of Law" in P.
Bierne & R. Quinney, eds, Marxism and Law (New York. John Wiley and Sons, 1982) 169; Hunt,
supra, note 58; P. Fitzpatrick, "Racism and the Innocence of Law" (1987) 14 J.L. & Soc'y 119
[hereinafter "Innocence of Law"]; P. Fitzpatrick, "Law, Modernization and Mystification" in R.J.
Simon & S. Spitzer, eds, Research in Law and Sociology: A Research Annual, vol. 3 (Greenwich,
Conn.: Ai Jai Press, 1980) 161 at 172; A.C. Hutchinson & A. Petter, "Private Rights/Public Wrongs:
The Liberal Lie of the Charter" (1988) 38 U.T.LJ. 278; and infra, notes 63-64.
62 See Fitzpatrick, "Innocence of Law," ibid at 122.
63 For recent examples, see H. Glasbeek & M. Mandel, "The Legalization of Politics in
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1992] Child Welfare Law 391
for example, critics have demonstrated how formal equality and
universality as central aspects of liberal legality facilitate, rather than
counteract, the concrete reality of racial oppression in Canada, the
United States, and Britain.64 I want to argue that the application of the
best interests standard in the context of First Nations child welfare can
be understood in similar terms. The tragic impact of child welfare law
on First Nations can be attributed in part to the liberal form taken by the
best interests principle in child welfare adjudication. It has directed
judges to focus on the child as an individual abstracted out of her
community and cultural contexts, and it has rendered judicial decisions
impartial and objective and, thereby, unassailable. 65
The ideological form of the best interests standard must also be
understood in the context of the historical development of the
conception of childhood and the role of the state in protecting children.
During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, childhood emerged as a
distinct stage in the life cycle during which time children were
recognized as socially, intellectually, and emotionally dependent, and
were thus entrusted to their families (and in particular their mothers) for
protection, nurturing, and socialization.66 In the nineteenth century, the
Advanced Capitalism: The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms" (1984) 2 Socialist Stud. 84;
J. Fudge, "The Public/Private Distinction: The Possibilities of and the Limits to the Use of Charter
Litigation to Further Feminist Struggles" (1987) 25 Osgoode Hall LJ. 485; S.B. Boyd, "From
Gender Specificity to Gender Neutrality? Ideologies in Canadian Child Custody Law" in C. Smart
& S. Sevenhuijsen, eds, Child Custody and the Politics of Gender (London: Routledge, 1989) 126; B.
Cossman, "A Matter of Difference: Domestic Contracts and Gender Equality" (1990) 28 Osgoode
Hall I-. 303; 3. Bakan, "Constitutional Interpretation and Social Change: You Can't Always Get
What You Want (Nor What You Need)" (1991) 70 Can. B. Rev. 307; and the cites infra, note 64.
64 See, eg., Fitzpatrick, "Innocence of Law," supra, note 61 at 119; K.W. Crenshaw, "Race,
Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law" (1988)
101 Harv. L. Rev. 1331; K.W. Crenshaw, "Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A
Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics"
(1989) U. Chi. L.F. 139; A.D. Freeman, "Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through
Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine" (1977-78) 62 Minn. L.
Rev. 1049; A.D. Freeman, "Racism, Rights and the Quest for Equality of Opportunity A Critical
Legal Essay" (1988) 23 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 295; A. Kobayashi, "Racism and the Law in
Canada: A Geographical Perspective" (1990) 11 Urb. Geography 447; and N. Duclos,
"Disappearing Women: Racial Minority Women in Human Rights Cases" (1992, forthcoming) 6(1)
CJ.W.L
65 1 discuss these aspects separately not to imply that they are distinct or discrete, but to assist
in analytical clarity.
66 p. Arias, Centuries of Childhood: A Social History of Family Life, trans. by R. Baldick (New
York: Random House, 1962). See also N. Mandell, "The Child Question: Links Between Women
and Children in the Family" in N. Mandell & A. Duffy, eds, Reconstructing the Canadian Family:
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conception of childhood as distinct from adulthood reached a new
height, and children's interests became increasingly recognized as
severable from, and independent of, those of their parents.67 As the
middle classes assimilated these understandings of childhood, concern
developed about the denial of childhood to working-class and poor
children. Consequently, a "child saving" movement emerged from what
had previously been a more generalized form of poor relief and religious
benevolence. 68
Around this time, courts started to become involved in the
protection of children. 69 Judicial concern, increasingly articulated in
terms of doing what was necessary for the "welfare" of the child, became
a justification for granting custody to mothers or removing children from
their families at the expense of previously unquestioned rights of fathers
to custody.70 Reinforced at the end of the nineteenth century by
Feminist Perspectives (Toronto: Butterworths, 1988) 49 at 56. Historical variations in the status and
role of children were closely intertwined with changing ideas about the status and role of women
within the family and society at large: see J. Ursel, "The State and the Maintenance of Patriarchy:
A Case Study of Family, Labour and Welfare Legislation in Canada" in J. Dickinson & B. Russell,
eds, Family, Economy & State: The Social Reproduction Process Under Capitalism (Toronto:
Garamond Press, 1986) 150 at 188.
67 M.L. Fineman, "The Politics of Custody and Gender: Child Advocacy and the
Transformation of Custody Decision Making in the USA" in Smart & Sevenhuijsen, supra, note 63,
27 at 30.
68 P.T. Rooke & R.L. Schnell, Discarding the Asylum: From Child Rescue to the Welfare State
in English-Canada (1800-1950) (Lantham, Md.: University Press of America, 1983) at 9-10. The
child saving movement formed part of a broader range of social and moral reform movements
which facilitated the internalization of middle-class conceptions of childhood and family by the
dependent poor and working classes: see, e.g., M. Valverde, The Age of Light, Soap, and Water:
Moral Reform in English Canada, 1885-1925 (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1991). For an
incisive consideration of the regulatory and coercive legal processes involved in the imposition of
bourgeois childhood and family ideology upon the working and dependant poor in the period
between the World Wars, see D.E. Chunn, "Rehabilitating Deviant Families through Family
Courts: The Birth of 'Socialized' Justice in Ontario, 1920-1940[1]" (1988) 16 Int'l J. Soc. L. 137;
D.E. Chunn, "Boys Will Be Men, Girls Will Be Mothers: The Legal Regulation of Childhood in
Toronto and Vancouver" in P.A. Adler & P. Adler, eds, Sociological Studies of Child Development,
vol. 3 (Greenwich, Conn.: Ai Jai Press, 1990) 87; and D.E. Chunn, From Punishment to Doing
Good: Family Courts and Socialized Justice in Ontario, 1880-1940 (Toronto: University of Toronto
Press, 1992).
69 C.B. Backhouse, "Shifting Patterns in Nineteenth-Century Canadian Custody Law" in D.H.
Flaherty, ed., Essays in the History of Canadian Law, vol. 1 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
1981) 212 at 213 and at 240. See also C. Smart, "Power and the Politics of Child Custody" in Smart
& Sevenhuijsen, supra, note 63,1 at 5 and at 8-9.
70 Baceaouse, ibid. See also Smart, ibid. at 6. On the connection between the inherentparens
patriae jurisdiction of superior courts and the best interest formulation, see M. Reitsma-Street,
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provincial legislation aimed at protecting the welfare of the child,71 state
authority to remove children from "unfit" parents continued to grow in
the twentieth century. 72 Gradually, the principle of the best interests of
the child was adopted by courts and, subsequently, by various
legislatures as the central test for resolving child welfare, custody, and
other issues involving children.73
Today, the best interests of the child standard provides broad
discretion to children's aid societies and judges. Such flexibility is
considered necessary to allow each case to be treated on its own
merits. 74 Though broad, the discretion afforded to judges and other
legal actors in the child welfare context is not unlimited. While the best
interests standard is conceptually indeterminate, the historical and
ideological context in which it is interpreted limits the meanings that will
be accepted by courts and other institutions.7S In the context of First
Nations child welfare, the liberal ideological form of the best interests
standard has served to constrain judicial decision making so as to
minimize, and even negate in some instances, the relevance and
importance of maintaining a child's First Nations identity and culture. It
provides an interpretive framework in which the removal and placement
of First Nations children away from their families and communities
"More Control Than Care: A Critique of Historical and Contemporary Laws for Delinquency and
Neglect of Children in Ontario" (1989-90) 3 CJ.W.L 510. There is also some judicial authority for
this connection: seeRe S.D. (1989), 100 A.R. 214 (Q.B.), aff'g (1988), 17 R.F.L (3d) 183 (Alta Prov.
Ct Fain. Div.); and Re Adoption of Infant Registration No. 78-09-024190, [1990] 2 C.N.L.R. 9(B.c.s.C.).
71 See, eg., An Act for the Prevention of Cruelty to, and Better Protection of Children, S.O. 1893,
c. 45., s. 18(3);AnAct Respecting Infants, S.A. 1913 (2d Sess.), c. 13, s. 6; and, generally, Ursel, supra,
note 66 at 185 discussing the statutes which provided the "legal apparatus for extending state
control over children."
72 Backhouse, supra, note 69 at 241; and Reitsma-Street, supra, note 69 at 513.
73 N. Bala, "Judicial Discretion and Family Law Reform in Canada" (1986) 5 Can. J. Faro. L
15 at 22 contrasting this development to the earlier reliance of judges on more rigid rules based on
the gender of the parents. See also supra, note 57.
74 R.F. Barnhorst, "Child Protection Legislation: Recent Canadian Reform" in B. Landau,
ed., Children's Rights in the Practice of Family Law (Toronto: Carswell, 1986) 255 at 256.
75 As Alan Hunt argues: "[T]he varieties of social construction of meaning and signification
have their limits in the kind of people who construct their social reality, whose language, ideology
and consciousness take particular (not just any) historical forms and thus result in determinant
limits to the variability of the social." A. Hunt, "The Big Fear: Law Confronts Postmodernism"
(1990) 35 McGill LJ. 507 at 532.
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appears natural, necessary, and legitimate,76 thereby giving judges some
basis for security and certainty in their decision making. Importantly
then, the best interests principle is not simply a mask for unbridled
discretion on the part of judges, but is itself "an instrument of
regulation." 77
Certainly, the focus on the best interests of the individual child in
child welfare cases is not entirely invalid. The impact on a child will
obviously be an important factor in any determination about her
placement. This is consistent with the operation of ideology, a central
characteristic of which is the potential for "something 'real' " to be
gained.78 The attraction of ideologies like those associated with the best
interests standard, even when such ideologies have negative
consequences, is partly explained by this dynamic. Moreover, the
interpretive framework established by best interests ideology is not so
rigid as to preclude occasional acceptance of oppositional
interpretations and justifications which do accord with the interests of
First Nations. This interplay is illustrated by some of the cases
considered below which reveal space within the legal framework of child
welfare for judicial decisions that give priority to the maintenance of
connections between a First Nations child, her extended family, and her
First Nation.79 Again, such positive results are consistent with the
operation of ideology which derives strength precisely because it does
not require complete enforcement.80 Indeed, the very nature of
7 6 See, eg., Eagleton, supra, note 58 at 58:
Successful ideologies are often thought to render their beliefs natural and self-evident-to
identify them with the 'common sense' of a society so that nobody could imagine how they
might ever be different ... [T]he ideology creat[es] as tight a fit as possible between itself and
social reality, thereby closing the gap into which the leverage of critique could be inserted ...
On this view, a ruling ideology does not so much combat alternative ideas as thrust them
beyond the very bounds of the unthinkable.
I am arguing here only that such decisions will appear natural, necessary, and legitimate in the
eyes of the dominant society. I make no claims in the context of this article as to the extent of
acceptance of such justifications by First Nations. See M.G. Kline, Child Welfare Law, Ideology,
and the First Nations (LL.M. Thesis, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, 1991) at 130 n. 24
[unpublished]; and Eagleton, supra, note 58 at 56.
77 I. Th~ry, " 'The Interest of the Child' and the Regulation of the Post-Divorce Family"
(1986) 14 Int'l J. Soc. L 341 at 345.
78 See Gavigan, supra, note 58 at 292. See also Eagleton, supra, note 58 at 45.
79 See infra, notes 102, 110,124, and accompanying text.
8 0 As Douglas Hay has observed about ideology, "[p]rovided that its depths are not explored
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dominant ideology is such that it must be continually constructed and
reconstructed in the face of challenges by contradictory and oppositional
ideologies. 8 ' Altogether, the determination of what is in the best
interests of a child in any given child welfare dispute is a site of
ideological struggle. However, once an ideology has assumed
dominance as a result of particular material conditions, its authority is
difficult to dislodge or shift. Dominant ideology is unlikely to be
transformed significantly without a change in the material conditions
which gave rise to it in the first place.82 Understanding this last aspect of
ideology provides some insight into the legislative reform experience in
Alberta discussed in the fourth section of this article.
Before getting there, the next two sections will investigate the
two inter-related aspects of the ideological form of the best interests of
the child principle identified above; that is, the focus on the child as an
abstract individual, and the purported universality and impartiality of
decisions rendered according to that principle.
B. "Best Interests of the Child" Ideology in First Nations Child
Welfare Cases
1. The First Nations child as abstract individual
The reasoning used by courts to justify First Nations child
welfare decisions relies upon a construction of a child's interests as
separate from, and abstracted out of, her familial and cultural context.
The best interests of the child standard serves in practice to privilege an
understanding of children as decontextualized individuals whose interests
are separate and distinct from those of their families, communities, and
too often or by too many, it remains a reservoir of belief throughout the society and flows into the
gaps made by individual acts of protest." Supra, note 58 at 55.
81 D. Macdonell, Theories of Discours" An Introduction (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986) at 33
describing Althusser's position that "no ideology takes shape outside a struggle with some opposing
ideology." See also A. Hunt, "Marxism, Law, Legal Theory and Jurisprudence" in P. Fitzpatrick,
ed., Dangerous Supplements: Resistance and Renewal in Jurisprudence (London: Pluto Press, 1991)
102 at 115 defining ideology as a "contested grid of competing frames of reference"; and Eagleton,
supra, note 58 at 45.
82 At bottom, the concept of ideology directs attention to the "material conditions of
[transformative] possibility" in any given context. Eagleton, supra, note 58 at 223. See also ibid. at
30.
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culturesP3 To this extent, it tends to render irrelevant or unimportant
the child's cultural identity and heritage, thus helping to justify her
separation from it. When judges determine "best interests" in First
Nations child welfare cases, facts and arguments are constructed and
organized so as to give credence and legitimacy to the removal of First
Nations children from their families and communities. By constructing
the child conceptually as separate from her culture, the actual removal of
the child from it is made to seem unproblematic.
This abstraction of child from culture happens in a number of
* ways, some more subtle than others. First, courts may explicitly deny the
relevance of maintaining a First Nations child's culture and identity or
assign it little weight relative to other factors. Second, courts may hold
that culture is important, but treat it as an abstract category that can be
filled by any First Nations culture, rather than that of the particular First
Nation to which the child belongs. Third, courts may emphasize the
child's psychological bonds with her foster parents, but not consider
relevant bonds with her culture. Alternatively, the courts may hold that
the child needs the stability of a permanent placement, while ignoring
the stability that would result from maintaining a connection to her
culture. Finally, courts may consider parents, families, or bands who
challenge removal orders or placement plans to have interests separate
from, and in conflict with, the interests of the child. I will now consider
examples of each of these constructions.
8 3 See Thry, supra, note 77 at 343.
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a) Individuation and the importance of maintaining a First Nations child's
culture and identity
Natural Parents v. Superintendent of Child Welfare84 provides a
good illustration of the relationship between an individualistic
construction of the child and the deemed irrelevance of concerns about
culture. A non-First Nations couple sought to adopt a status Indian
child who had been apprehended from his parents and placed in foster
care in their home. The natural parents refused to consent to the
adoption and asked instead that the child be raised by an aunt and uncle
in accordance with Tsartlip and Songhees traditions.85 In the trial
judge's view, the conflict that arose in the case could "only be resolved in
the light of the best interests of the child himself. He [had to] be
considered as an individual," and this meant considering the child "not a
part of a race or culture."8 6 Culture and heritage were thus deemed
separate from, and irrelevant to, his best interests as an individual. The
judge regarded the complex "claims of native custom" in the case as
merely claims of "heredity" which were necessarily in conflict with claims
of "environment. 87 In the end, "the best interests of the child himself"
were held to require retention of custody by the foster parents through
adoption.88 In a more recent decision,8 9 another Court stated that
84 [1976] 2 S.C.R. 751 [hereinafter Natural Parents]. The Supreme Court of Canada decided
the case on the basis of a constitutional point. The interesting issues from our perspective were
addressed at trial and can be gathered from the reasons of the trial judge noted in the judgment of
the Supreme Court. The specific constitutional point was whether the application of the provincial
Adoption Act, R.S.B.C. 1960, c. 4 [hereinafter Adoption Act] would extinguish the child's rights to
Indian status and was therefore not applicable to the adoption of status Indian children. The
Supreme Court held unanimously that the Adoption Act applied and thus that the adoption order at
issue was valid. A majority of six out of nine judges held that the application of the Adoption Act did
not interfere with the federally determined question of status. For further commentary on the case,
see McNeil et aL, supra, note 8 at 5; and McGillivray, supra, note 12.
85 Natural Parents, ibid. at 768.
8 6 Ibid. (emphasis added).
87bid.
88 The trial judge arrived at this conclusion despite his acknowledgement that there was
"potential danger to a native child being brought up in a white family, particularly when he reached
the later stages of adolescence." This was balanced in his mind by an "intelligently imposed
environment" which would in the end be determinative of the child's later adjustment. Although
there were relatives in the community wishing to assume the care of the child, the trial judge held
not only that it would be in the child's best interests to remain where he was, but also that the foster
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"maternal instinct, the wishes of other members of the family and
matters of cultural background and heritage cannot be allowed to interfere
with the paramount consideration of the best interests of the
child"90 -once again separating the analysis of best interests from
concerns about maintaining cultural connection. On this basis, an
Ojibway mother was denied access to her eight-year-old daughter who
had been adopted by her foster parents.
The distinction which courts draw between a child's best interests
and the relevance of her "race or culture" is also apparent in cases where
courts impose the burden of proving the importance of maintaining
cultural connection for the individual child upon parties seeking to
regain custody of a child. In John v. Superintendent of Child Welfare,91
for example, Perry L.J.S.C. of the British Columbia Supreme Court held
that the proposition "that an Indian child has a better chance in life by
living among his relatives and among others of his race" could not be
accepted unless it was "possible to demonstrate that this [was] so, by way
of some cogent evidence, with particular reference to this child."9 2
Accordingly, the judge attached little weight to evidence demonstrating
in general terms the experience of identity crisis and dislocation faced by
First Nations children raised in white families, and the sense of identity
and cultural understanding fostered in First Nations children when
raised among their own people.93 Because this general evidence did not
establish the importance of the particular child involved in the dispute
remaining in his community, Perry L.J.S.C. rejected an attempt by the
child's mother to regain custody from a non-First Nations couple who
had adopted him. Similarly, in C.J.K v. Children's Aid Society of
Metropolitan Toronto,94 a statutory requirement to consider the "racial
parents had established a "right" to the custody of the child. Ibid. at 768-69.
89 Racine v. Woods (1984), [1985] 2 C.N.LIR 187 (Man. Q.B.). See infra, notes 100, 106-109,
113, 131, 132-42, and accompanying text for more detailed consideration of the various judgments in
this case including a decision by the Supreme Court of Canada.
90 Ibid. at 190-91 (emphasis added). See also Re J.H. and N.H. (1988), 3 Y.R. 282 at 291
where the Yukon Territorial Court concluded that, while "[t]he cultural heritage of the children
[was] one of the factors and an important factor to be considered[,] ... [t]he welfare of the children
... is the predominant factor."
91 (1979), [1982] 1 C.N.L.R 40, 10 R.F.L (2d) 330 [hereinafter John cited to C.N.L.R.].
92 Ibid. at 47 (emphasis added).
93 Ibid. at 48.
94 [1989] 4 C.N.L.R. 75 (Ont. Prov. Ct Fain. Div.) [hereinafter CJ.K].
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culture and origins" of children in the child welfare statute in question95
was held to have been included only to "underscore the recognized
importance, to any individual, of familial roots, heritage and tradition."96
Custody was denied to the First Nations grandmother of three
apprehended children because, inter alia, there was no evidence that she
would "ensure the retention and respect for the Indian culture.,97 It was
also important that the children themselves were considered by the
judge to have no First Nations identity.98 These cases demonstrate a
heavy and individuated burden on those arguing the importance of
maintaining a child's First Nations cultural connection.
More generally, the retention and promotion of First Nations
identity has seldom been recognized as an overriding, or even a
substantially weighty, factor. 99 In Racine, for example, the Supreme
Court of Canada rejected the proposition that the search for a home
with the identical racial background as the child should be a paramount
consideration in making a determination on adoption.100 The result in
Racine was followed in Re W.W. where the Alberta Court of Queen's
Bench indicated that, if the trial judge had "placed greater emphasis on
[First Nations heritage considerations] ... than on the issue of bonding,"
she would have been considered to have applied incorrect legal
principles.10 1 A few recent decisions suggest some willingness on the
part of courts to presume and judicially notice retention of First Nations
identity and culture as a relevant factor in determining best interests.10 2
95 Child and Family Services Act, 1984, S.O. 1984, c. 55.
96 C.K, supra, note 94 at 81 (emphasis added).
9 7 bid. at 81. Having left her reserve at the age of fifteen, the grandmother was considered to
be "fully acclimated to urban life in Southern Ontario and to have long ago cast away her own racial
heritage and tradition." Ibid at 82.
9 8 Ibid. "[In this case there is no evidence of any recognition by the older children of their
Native heritage." Note: this line is reported in the original judgment (28 June 1988), Toronto
#C1867/85 (Ont. Prov. Ct Fain. Div.), although it is missing in the C.N.L.R. report of the case.
99 What I am describing as the importance of maintaining a child's First Nations identity and
culture seems to correspond to what Carasco identifies as "the indigenous factor." See supra, note
4.
100 This is the way Kerans J.A. characterized Racine in Re H.L, [1984] 3 C.N.LR. 86 at 96
(Alta CA.).
101 (1989), 100 A.R. 221 at 232.
102 In Re H.R, supra, note 100 at 96, for example, a First Nations mother declared to be
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However, the individual and abstract focus of the best interests criterion
makes such recognition difficult, and it is usually tenuous.
At best, the retention of First Nations culture and identity by a
First Nations child plays an ambiguous role in judicial application of the
best interests standard. It is not surprising then that the most legally
authoritative description of the meaning of "best interests" fails to even
mention the importance of retaining a child's First Nations culture and
identity or to indicate the weight to be accorded to this factor.
[T]he dominant consideration to which all other considerations must remain subordinate
must be the welfare of the child. This is not to say that the question of custody will be
determined by weighing the economic circumstances of the contending parties. The
matter will not be determined solely on the basis of the physical comfort and material
advantages that may be available in the home of one contender or the other. The welfare
of the child must be decided on a consideration of these and all other relevant factors,
including the general psychological, spiritual and emotional welfare of the child. It must
be the aim of the Court, when resolving disputes between rival claimants for the custody
of a child, to choose the course which will best provide for the healthy growth,
development and education of the child so that he will be equipped to face the problems
of life as a mature adult.
103
Thus, in some cases, the importance of maintaining a First
Nations child's identity and culture is not taken account of at all; in
others, a heavy individualistic burden is placed on those asserting it; and,
in still others, it is understood by the courts as being separate from, and
irrelevant to, the question of the child's best interests. What ties all of
these together, I want to suggest, is a conceptual separation of the
individual child in question from her cultural context. That context is
unfit as a parent was allowed access to her child in foster care to enable the child, who was being
raised in a white foster home, to "have some happy exposure to the native community and culture."
The Court recognized that "the simplest and most natural way was for [the child] to maintain a
relationship with his natural relatives." See also Carasco, supra, note 4 at 126. Similarly, in An&
supra, note 57 at 103, one of the factors relied on by the Supreme Court of Canada in upholding the
decision at first instance and in the Court of Appeal in favour of adoptive parents was that the
adoptive mother "share[d] with [the child, whose father was a First Nations man] ... some Indian
ancestry." This factor was found to "stand ... in her favour" on the basis that "one would expect that
she [would] be enabled to understand and deal with problems the child [might] encounter in [that]
respect." While this general recognition of the importance of maintaining a First Nations child's
cultural identity and heritage is welcome, the specific application of the importance of this factor in
the particular context-of this case is problematic. It is relied on in this case to deny custody to the
white mother of a First Nations child as opposed to operating in favour of a First Nations mother
and against the retention of custody by white foster parents. As well, this case can be understood as
an example of the "abstraction of culture" discussed in the next section.
103 Mn& supra, note 57 at 101.
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portrayed as irrelevant or unimportant to the determination of her best
interests.
b) The abstraction of culture
When courts do consider culture, they often do so in abstract
terms. They reconstruct the concern of First Nations in maintaining the
connection between each First Nations child and the heritage and
culture of her particular First Nation into a concern about maintaining a
connection to First Nations heritage and culture in the abstract. In other
words, the specificity of different First Nations cultures is obscured.
This tendency is, I suggest, partly the result of the abstract and
individualistic character of best interests ideology. "Cultural
connection" cannot be seen as directed to the maintenance of a tie
between a child and her particular First Nation when the child has
already been constructed as an individual abstracted out of her culture.
For example, in Re A.B., Landerkin J. of the Alberta Provincial Court
assumed that, because the foster parents of the First Nations children in
question lived in a small town "contiguous to a large Indian Reserve ...
[i]t would be a fair inference that this physical location would allow this
part of their heritage to be explored." This was despite the fact that the
reserve in question was not the original home of the children.104 The
Court did not even consider whether the reserve community was part of
the children's First Nation 05
Similarly, in Racine,106 the Supreme Court of Canada thought
that concerns raised about maintaining the Ojibway child's culture and
identity were sufficiently met by the "sensitivity" of the adoptive parents
(one white, the other Mrtis) "to the interracial aspect [of the adoption]
and their appreciation of the need to encourage and develop in [the
child] a sense of her own worth and dignity and the worth and dignity of
104 (1989), 100 A.R. 150 at 154 where permanent guardianship of three First Nations children,
aged 6, 3, and 2, was granted to the Director on the basis that the children were thriving in the foster
home where they had been for the past two years. The mother from whose care they were removed
had substance abuse problems and lived "a transient lifestyle." bid- at 153.
105 Tellingly, whether the reserve close to the foster parent's home and the children's home
reserve belonged to the same First Nation is not ascertainable from the judgment.
10 6 Supra, note 57 (S.C.C).
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her people. 107 This ruling was made despite Matas J.A.'s concern in the
Court of Appeal that the white, adoptive mother could never sufficiently
provide the child with the information and role modelling required to
transmit successfully to the child an understanding of Ojibway heritage-
and culture.108 The Supreme Court was of the view that the M6tis
adoptive father would be in a position to provide the child with "a model
... of how to survive as a member of a much maligned minority."109
Though such instruction would obviously be important to the child, the
Court was not concerned with finding out whether the adoptive father
would be able to provide her with any exposure to the Ojibway language
and culture that were her heritage.
It should be noted that, in some cases, courts have been sensitive
to the specificity of First Nations identity and culture, holding that
custody should be granted to someone capable of transmitting the
identity and culture of the child's First Nation and/or providing for
continued access by the child's parents or other extended family
members. In Sandy v. Nootchtai,110 for example, a First Nations woman
sought custody of a fifteen-month-old child who had been in her care for
six months following apprehension from his mother who had
subsequently died. A custody application was also brought by the child's
maternal aunt and supported by the late mother's band. The Court
stated that "[t]he assertion of blood relationship and more particularly
Indian blood relationship must still be considered in the context of the
child's best interests"111 and came to a determination in favour of the
maternal aunt. In addition to the aunt's demonstrated parenting
capabilities, the Court appears to have recognized that, with her, the
child would also have the benefit of being raised within his own First
Nation 12
1 0 7 bid. at 186 (S.C.C.).
108 Woods v. Racine (1982), [1983] 2 C.N.L.R. 157 at 187 (Man. C.A.) [hereinafter Racine
(Man. CA.)].
109Racine, supra, note 57 at 178 (S.C.C.).
110 [1989] 3 C.N.L.R. 190 (Ont. Prov. Ct Fain. Div.) [hereinafter Nootchtai].
111 Ibid. at 194.
112 Ibid. at 196. See also Kenora-Patricia Child and Family Services v. L. (P.), (2 September
1987), Kenora C227/81 (Ont. Prov. Ct Faro. Div.), Wang J. (recognizing that the child's "cultural
development" would be "almost a certainty" with the chosen foster mother, an Ojibway woman, and
also providing for continued access by the mother); J.T.K v. Kenora-Patricia Child and Family
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c) Psychological bonding and permanent placement versus cultural
connection
The above analysis suggests that courts are, at best, ambiguous
about the importance of maintaining First Nations identity and heritage
in child welfare cases. On occasion, they recognize the importance of a
child's connection to his culture, but tend not to give it much weight-let
alone see it as central. By way of contrast, the psychological
connection-or bond-that a child has developed with her caregivers
and/or the permanence of the care situation in which she is placed are
generally regarded as crucial to the child's welfare. More often than not,
courts find these latter factors to be more consistent with a child's
welfare than maintenance of her First Nations identity and culture.
Underlying the weighing of these factors by courts is a justifiable
concern with the stability of the child's environment and her
corresponding emotional security. The problem is that this concern is
understood as severable from the maintenance of the child's First
Nations identity and heritage, again reflecting the individualistic and
abstract focus of the best interests standard.
This point is illustrated by Wilson J.'s reliance in Racine113 on the
evidence of a medical expert to the effect that the case had
nothing to do with race, absolutely nothing to do with culture, ... nothing to do with
ethnic background. It's two women and a little girl, and one of them doesn't know her.
It's as simple as that; all the rest of it is extra and of no consequence, except to the people
involved, of course. 114
Services, [1985] 4 C.N.LR. 76 (Ont. Prov. Ct Fain. Div.) (held in favour of placement of the children
in the home of relatives on a northern Ojibway reserve their parents came from as opposed to with
a more materially well-off Mohawk couple living on a southern Ontario reserve); Re W. W., supra,
note 101; and Re W. W. (1988), 93 A.R. 248 (Prov. Ct Fain. Div.).
113 Supra, note 57 (S.C.C.). The significance placed on bonding is also in evident in Kng
supra, note 57 at 87 (headnote), where a mother revoked her consent to the adoption of her child
within three months following his birth, and sought to regain custody of him from the prospective
adoptive parents whom she had chosen. Though the child had been in the care of the adoptive
parents for only seven and a half months at the time of trial, the trial judge held that "[t]he benefits
to the child of maintaining the blood ties to his natural mother were outweighed by those resulting
from maintenance of his present home stability and his existing parental bonds to the adoptive
parents." This decision was affirmed by both the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court. In Kn&
however, it should be recognized that the emphasis placed on bonding served to reinforce rather
than counter the importance of maintaining the child's First Nations identity.
114 Supra, note 57 at 188 (S.C.C.) quoting the words of the medical expert.
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Accordingly, Wilson J. concluded that "when the test to be met is the
best interests of the child, the significance of cultural background and
heritage as opposed to bonding abates over time. The closer the bond
that develops with the prospective adoptive parents the less important
the racial element becomes." 115
A similar approach is evident in Re E.J C.116 At issue was
whether a two-year-old First Nations boy should be placed with his First
Nations maternal grandmother or adopted by his non-First Nations
foster mother. The child's mother wanted him to be placed in the care
of his grandmother. The Court acknowledged that the child "would
benefit from some peripheral contact with his own culture through the
special efforts made by the foster parents in that regard,"'117 but
recognized that his cultural development would be far greater in his
grandmother's home where he would also have the benefit of association
with his extended family." 8 Nonetheless, it concluded that the potential
placements were, prima facie, "relatively equal" because of the potential
strength of the child's bond to the foster parents, with whom he had
lived for one year, as compared to that of any "remnants of bonding" to
his grandmother, with whom he also had lived and who had provided
"back-up" care for him prior to his apprehension. 1 9 Accordingly, a
further four months of temporary wardship and continued placement
with the foster parents was granted, inter alia, to enable further evidence
of the extent of the child's psychological attachments to be presented 20
The difficulty with these cases is not so much that psychological bonding
is viewed as important for a child's emotional stability and security, but
115 Ibid. at 187. See also N.P.P. v. Regional Children's Guardian (1988), 14 R.FL. (3d) 55
(Alta Q.B.) [hereinafter N.P.P.] quashing a decision of the Children's Guardian of Alberta to place
a child on a reserve with an extended family member because the relevance of disrupting the
attachment of the particular child in question to her foster parents was not properly considered.
For a more extensive discussion of this case, see infra, notes 156-61 and accompanying text.
116 (1987), 79 A.R. 125 (Prov. Ct).
117bid. at 130. The foster mother had testified that the family "participate[d] in some native
cultural and social events." Ibid. at 127.
118 Ibid. at 130.
119Ibid. at 130 and at 126.
120 Ibid. at 130. Increasing the time period during which the child remained with the foster
parents, however, would also serve to increase the emotional attachment of the child to them.
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rather that a child's connection to her First Nations culture is not
understood in similar terms.
In addition to psychological bonding, permanent placement of a
child has been accorded greater priority in a number of cases than
maintaining a child's connection to her First Nations culture. In Re
S.D.,121 for example, the Court was concerned that the provincial
Children's Guardian, though requesting the permanent wardship of a
First Nations child, had not provided a permanent placement plan. The
Children's Guardian had testified that a permanent plan had not yet
been determined because the First Nations child welfare worker
assigned to the case was in the middle of investigating the possibility of
placing the child with a family on the mother's reserve. The child's white
father had submitted a plan proposing that the child come to live with
him and the child's paternal grandmother in Ontario. Clearly, the
Children's Guardian required more time to determine the best
placement for the child and, in particular, to make every effort to find a
placement for the child with members of his own reserve. Rather than
leaving the timing of the preparation of a permanent placement plan to
the discretion of the Children's Guardian, however, the Court granted
permanent guardianship to the Children's Guardian on the condition
that a plan be filed within sixty days. This decision was subsequently
upheld on appeal to the Court of Queen's Bench.12 2 By favouring
quicker assurance of a permanent placement elsewhere, the likelihood
of the child being placed with a family on the child's reserve was
substantially decreased. The Court's concern with a stable placement
for the child, evident in the considerable weight it attached to
permanency, 123 appears to have overridden concerns about maintaining
the child's First Nations identity and connection to his culture. Indeed,
121 Supra, note 70 (Alta Prov. Ct Fain. Div.).
1 2 2 Re S.D., supra, note 70 (Alta Q.B.). This decision was subsequently followed in Re A.B.,
supra, note 104.
123 See also Re Cherie M. (1983), 53 A.R. 48 at 56 (Prov. Ct), where the concern with
permanent placement was described in this way: "it appears that the latest 'buzz-word' in the child
welfare field is 'permanency planning.' The Director is receiving much criticism for permitting
children to 'drift' through the system." In that case, however, where the First Nations child in
question came into temporary care on the basis of a voluntary agreement between the society and
her mother, the Court concluded that "[w]hatever validity there may be to the charge that the
Director has permitted that to happen in other cases, ... it would be grossly premature to do other
than to work at this time towards the reuniting of [this child] and her mother and her siblings." /bk
1992]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
the Court's reasoning strongly implies that these latter concerns are not
even related to the child's stability.
Kenora-Patricia Child and Family Services v. MM1 24 provides an
encouraging counter example to the tendencies evident in Re S.D.,
though one that may be explained in part by the express requirement in
the governing legislation to take account of culture.1 25 The Provincial
Court of Ontario considered an application by the Child and Family
Services agency proposing the permanent and divided placement of four
First Nations siblings, aged six, five, three and two, with two sets of non-
First Nations foster parents with whom they had lived for two years. The
agency also sought to have the children adopted by the foster parents.
The application was opposed by the children's natural parents and band
who proposed that the children all be placed with the mother's cousin
and her husband and that there be continued contact with the parents.
The agency argued that the children's need for "permanency, a stable
placement." was a "substantial reason" for placing the children elsewhere
than on the reserve.126 This argument was rejected by the Court on the
ground that the factors of stability and maintenance of First Nations
identity could not be considered independently of one another.
According to the Court, a truly successful permanent placement
required that a First Nations child's need for retention of identity and
culture be met.
Although permanency is important, cultural heritage is also important. In fact there is
good reason to infer that without cultural heritage being recognized as integral to human
growth, permanency will never succeed. One cannot deny what one is; we cannot deny
what these children are. They are Ojibway, and unless that is an integral part of our
decision making, there is little hope that permanency planning will succeed.
12 7
124 (1989), 3 Ont. Fain. L Rep. 38 (Prov. Ct).
125 With respect to the protection of the children's First Nations identity accorded by the
statute in question, the Court observed, ibid. at 39, that "[tihese are not just bald, technical words
but finally recognized [sic] as being of eminent importance to a child's healthy development.
Without full respect and recognition of these children's past and cultural heritage, their future will
be precarious."
Accordingly, the Court approved the placement of the children with members of their
extended family on the reserve on the grounds that this was required by both the Act and the best
interests standard.
126 ibi at 39.
1271"bid.
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d) The construction of those who challenge dispositional decisions
To this point, I have focused on how courts tend in many cases to
construct the welfare of First Nations children in ways that obscure, or at
least undervalue, the maintenance of a First Nations child's culture and
identity. Underlying this approach, I have argued, is a conception of the
child as an abstracted individual whose interests are severable from
those of her extended family, community, and First Nation. In this
section, I will analyze the judicial construction of parties who challenge
the state's removal of First Nations children. Related to the emphasis
on the separate and individual interests of the child considered above is
a construction of parents or others who challenge the removal of a child
from their care as acting in their individual-or selfish-interests 28
First Nations mothers and members of a child's extended family or band
who challenge a determination of a child's best interests are regarded as
acting selfishly and as having "vested interests" rendering them
incapable of "impartial" consideration of the child's best interests.129
Moreover, the individualistic emphasis of the best interests analysis
tends to preclude consideration of the collective interests and concerns
of First Nations, usually represented by particular bands, in preventing
First Nations children from being placed outside of their
communities.13 0
The judicial construction of First Nations mothers as selfish is
well illustrated in Racine.131 The case involved a First Nations child who
had spent most of her seven years in the care of a white foster mother
and a M6tis foster father. The Supreme Court of Canada had to decide
between reinstating an adoption order in favour of the foster parents,
previously overturned by the Manitoba Court of Appeal, or restoring
128 Th~ry, supra, note 77 at 347. See, for example, Re K and Children's Aid Society of
Hamilton-Wentworth (1989), 70 O.R. (2d) 466 (Unif. Fam. Ct) holding that the right of the parent to
raise a child is subordinate to the best interests of the child, implying that the interests of the parent
and the child are distinct, and the latter necessarily excludes the former.
129 Smart, supra, note 69 at 24, makes a similar point relating to mothers in general in the
context of intra-family child custody disputes.
130 Monture, supra, note 4 at 13, also makes this point. For a discussion of the theoretical
basis of the collective rights of the First Nations, see D.M. Johnston, "Native Rights as Collective
Rights: A Question of Group Self-Preservation" (1989) 2 Can. J.L & Jurisprudence 19.
13 1 Supra, note 57 (S.C.C.).
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legal custody or access to the child's natural mother, Linda Woods, an
Ojibway woman. Wilson J., in considering the importance of
maintaining a child's tie to her natural parents, concluded that this factor
was relevant only in relation to its impact on the child, not the parent:
"it is the parental tie as a meaningful and positive force in the life of the
child and not in the life of the parent that the court has to be concerned
about."13 2 There is little doubt that considering the significance and
meaning of a parental tie from the perspective of the child in question is
important. Wilson J. goes further than this, however, and implies that a
parent's concern with maintaining a tie is often based on self-interest:
As has been emphasized many times in custody cases, a child is not a chattel in which its
parents have a proprietary interest; it is a human being to whom they owe serious
obligations. In giving the court power to dispense with the consent of the parent on a de
facto adoption the legislature has recognized an aspect of the human condition-that our
own self interest sometimes clouds our perception of what is best for those for whom we
are responsible. It takes a very high degree of selflessness and maturity-for most of us
probably an unattainable degree-for a parent to acknowledge that it might be better for
his or her child to be brought up by someone else.133
Thus, according to Wilson J., there is a natural self-interest of parents
which renders them incapable of distinguishing their own selfish desiresfrom their child's best interests.134
The trial judge in Racine had found further evidence of the
mother's apparent selfishness in her "exploitation of media attention"135
132 Ib& at 185. See also Children's Aid Society of Halifax v. C.M.N. (1989), 91 N.S.R. (2d) 232
at 235-36 (Fain. Ct) stating that "the argument concerning parental rights and the breaking of the
bond between parent and child is valid up to a point. However, the best interest of the child has to
come first ... the individual rights of the child override all others."
133 Racine; ibid
134 See also Kenora-Patricia Child and Family Services v. M.(C) (2 February 1989), Kenora
C241/83 (Ont. Prov. Ct Faro. Div.), digested at (1989), 15 A.C.W.S. (3d) 78: Little J. sympathizes
with an aunt, who wants custody of two First Nations children presently in foster care, but
emphasizes that he must decide on the basis of what is best for children, not her. The aunt's reasons
for wanting custody are characterized by the Court as "hav[ing] to do with meeting her own needs as
opposed to the needs of the children." One would think, moreover, that given the "self-sacrificing
ideology of motherhood," and the attendant expectation that mothers generally act in the child's
best interest, mothers would be judged with particular severity when challenging determinations
based upon the child's best interests. Susan Boyd has demonstrated this point in the context of intra-
familial, child custody cases: supra, note 63 at 147. This may help to explain the particularly
negative construction of the stated interests of the mother in Racine, both at first instance and in the
Supreme Court.
135 Supra, note 108 at 188 (Man. C.A.).
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which was thought to "manifest ... an incredible indifference to the effect
such an incident might have on her child."136 The mother's politicization
of the issue, moreover, was regarded by the trial judge, in statements
uncritically repeated by Wilson J. in the Supreme Court, as being against
the child's best interests. According to Wilson J., the trial judge "saw
danger signals in 'the venom of her anti-white feelings' and wondered
what effect 'her visible hatred for all things white' would have on her
child. She also wondered whether Mrs. Woods' concern was for the
child as a person or as a political issue."137 Implicit in these remarks is a
presumption that the mother's political concerns were necessarily
inconsistent with the best interests of her child. The trial judge, and
possibly Wilson J,138 regarded it as not in this child's best interests to
have what they viewed as a political First Nations mother, one who
acknowledged, confronted, and attempted to resist what she perceived
as harsh treatment of herself and her people by the child welfare
system.139 Linda Woods not only failed to conform to the dominant
conception of a good mother, but also to that of a" 'good' Indian," one
who "is defined in terms of white values and culture and in terms of
docile and apolitical behaviour."' 40 She defended the importance of her
people maintaining an Ojibway way of life, actively resisted the impact of
the child welfare system on her daughter and herself, and challenged the
threat which the system provided to the survival of her community and
First Nation.
13 6 Supra, note 57 at 179 (S.C.C.).
13 7 Racin4 supra, note 57 at 179 (S.C.C.).
138 Matas J.A. in the Court of Appeal had declared irrelevant concerns about the mother's
politicization of the case: supra, note 108 at 188. Wilson J. could have done the same.
139 See also J.TK v. Kenora-Patricia Child and Family Services, supra, note 112 where the
judge is disparaging of a Chiefs threat, prior to the court proceedings, to go to the media; and an
unreported case discussed in York, supra, note 7 at 221 where a British Columbia Provincial Court
judge placed a First Nations child with a Mormon family even though his aunt wanted to adopt him.
The judge decided that the aunt was unsuitable "because she was a strong Indian activist who would
take the boy to protests and political battles," and thus could not provide "a stable, quiet structured
life" for the child. See also K. Arnup," 'Mothers Just Like Others': Lesbians, Divorce, and Child
Custody in Canada" (1989) 3 CJ.W.L 18 at 27-31 for a similar analysis in the context of the effect of
lesbian "militancy" in child custody cases involving lesbian mothers. Drawing insight from this latter
article, it might be that proud, "confrontational," "militant" First Nations mothers have difficulty
regaining custody of their children from the state because they directly flaunt dominant structures
and are thus judged to be more likely to raise their children out of accord with dominant values.
140 Kellough, supra, note 10 at 354.
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Yet, Linda Woods's anger and frustration were portrayed in the
judgments in Racine only in a negative light-as a barrier to, rather than
evidence of, her continued rehabilitation and commitment to the best
interests of her daughter.141 The judgments do not recognize the
strength reflected in her anger, nor the fact that she overcame the
adversity in her own life and successfully re-established a life with her
other children, nor her determination to take every possible measure to
regain custody of her child. Moreover, no attempt is made to perceive
Linda Woods's anger as the understandable product of her repeatedly
frustrated efforts to regain custody of her daughter prior to initiating the
proceedings which resulted in the court case, let alone to situate that
anger in the historical context of colonialist white/First Nations relations
in Canada. She is presented as acting only for her own (impliedly self-
serving and therefore illegitimate) political purposes.142
In some cases, it is not only parents or other family members
who challenge the removal of children, but also the child's band. The
collective concerns of bands in such cases reflect a number of
considerations. First, bands often consider the best interests of an
individual child to require that the child not be removed from her
community and culture.143 Second, there is concern about the
destructive impact that the system has had on First Nations
communities, sometimes removing whole generations of children and
thereby depriving communities of the capacity to regenerate
themselves.1 4 Third, and related to the first two considerations, is the
traditional priority accorded by First Nations to collective, as well as
141 Racine, supra, note 57 at 178-79 (S.C.C.).
142 See also VS. v. M.M., [1989] N.W.T.R. 169 at 177 (S.C.) where the Court granted standing
to a white, middle-class couple living in Nova Scotia who wanted custody of a twelve-year-old
Chipewyan child in foster care in Yellowknife on the ground that there "appear[ed] to be no one
else who [was] prepared to put forward the child's wishes, as expressed in her letters, or to ensure
that the possibility of her finding a congenial and suitable permanent family environment [was] at
least given a chance of realization." To arrive at such a conclusion, the judge must have considered
that the child's grandmother and mother, who opposed the application, to represent their own, as
opposed to the child's, interests. In contrast, the applicants, who had had only a short-term, long-
distance relationship with the child, were thought to represent her best interests.
143 See, e.g., D.J. Goldsmith, "Individual vs. Collective Rights: The Indian Child Welfare
Act" (1990) 13 Harv. Women's Li. 1 at 2.
144 bid. See also supra, note 4; and Johnston, supra, note 130 at 32 arguing that "[t]he right of
native communities to self-preservation" is the "foundational right accorded to collective entities
capable of bearing rights."
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individual, concerns.145 With respect to the latter of these, Patricia
Monture has stated, "[t]he structure of First Nation's society is based on
cooperation and consensus ... In a community which operates on norms
of consensus and cooperation, the collective's rights are the focus. By
contrast, the structures of the dominant society operate with the
individual as the problem-solving unit."146  In the context of child
welfare, the traditional collective focus takes the form of a recognized
communal responsibility for the care of children. An elder in Alberta
explained the traditional approach this way:
The Indian Philosophy is that when you bring a child into this world, you are responsible
for that child until that child can look after himself or herself ... For example: like in the
family home, if things didn't work out well for that young couple, supposing if there was a
sickness in that family, or the mother died or the father died, it is the practice and the
cultured belief of our native people that automatically an uncle, an aunt or grandmother,
grandfather or a cousin or even a good friend or those people would take over the
responsibility for raising that child and that is expected of society in those days ... It's
unfortunate now that there is so many things that have entered into the native way of life,
that we have lost these values of the family home.
1 4 7
Within the individualistic structure of best interests ideology, however,
courts tend not to acknowledge, nor act on, such collective concerns. In
particular, as noted above, the individualistic structure of the best
interests ideology supports a presumption that the collective interests of
First Nations are "inevitably antagonistic"'148 to the individual interests
of the child in question. As a consequence, court cases have tended to
presume that, if the interests of the First Nations community are met,
the child's interests must necessarily be forgone.149
This disregard for the collective concerns of First Nations has
contributed to the difficulty bands150 have had in advancing their
1 4 5 Monture, supra, note 4 at 6.
146 Ibid. See also Bull, supra, note 3 at 527. But, see also M.E. Turpel, "Aboriginal Peoples
and the Canadian Charter Interpretive Monopolies, Cultural Differences" (1989-90) 6 Can. Hum.
Rts Y.B. 3 at 16-17 who writes "I would take issue with some scholars on their projection of 'society'
as an either-or [/e., individualist or collectivist], and caution against an attempt to typify, for
example, an Aboriginal society in such a fashion."
14 7 Child Welfare Needs, supra, note 7 at 50-51.
148 Johnston, supra, note 130 at 19.
149 Smart, supra, note 69 at 23, makes a similar point with regard to parental concerns in the
context of a discussion of intra-familial child custody issues.
150 Bands are now generally recognized by First Nations as having a major role in the
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interests in child welfare proceedings involving First Nations children.151
In particular, their concerns about the impact of the child welfare system
upon the collective interests of the First Nations or a particular band are
liable to be deemed irrelevant, indeed, illegitimate. In Kenora-Patricia
Child and Family Services v. Rose F.,152 for example, a Band representing
the interests of a reserve had made a general argument urging the Court
to take seriously its obligation, as set out in section 53(5) of the Child
and Family Services Act, to place a First Nations child "with a member of
the child's extended family; [or] a member of the child's band or native
community."153 The Court ordered costs against the Band because it
had advanced only this general position and had not presented a specific
plan to the Court with regard to the placement of the particular child in
question. According to Little J.:
I appreciate very much and sympathize with the position of the Islington Band but there
are many children of the reserve who have become wards of the state ... [and] the Band is
obliged with respect to every individual case before the court to develop the position not
based on an opinion with regard to the effect of the child welfare system on the reserve but
rather aposition based on the facts of theparticular case before the court.15 4
articulation and protection of collective interests, and, in child welfare cases, they often take on this
role: see, generally, Johnston, supra, note 130 at 31, considering whether bands constitute truly
representative collectivities.
151 Increasingly, though, courts are recognizing the important contribution of bands to the
determination of the best interests of a First Nations child by allowing them to intervene in child
welfare proceedings: see, eg., Pitzel v. Children Aid Society of Winnipeg, [1984] 5 W.W.R. 474, [1984]
4 C.N.LR. 41 (Man. Q.B. Fam. Div.) [hereinafter Pitzel cited to W.w.R.]; Nootchta4 supra, note
110; Re Catholic Children's Aid Society of Metropolitan Toronto and M. (1986), 57 O.R. (2d) 551
(Prov. Ct Fam. Div.), aff'd (1987), 62 O.R. (2d) 535 (Dist. Ct); and Children's Aid Society of
Nippissing (District of) v. Ruby M., [1989] 2 C.N.L.R. 21 (Prov. Ct Faro. Div.). However, courts
continue to refuse to provide custody of a child to a band. The governing statutes in each province,
which emphasize the provision of protective care by specific individuals, are partly responsible for
this refusal: Tom v. Winnipeg Children's Aid Society, [1982] 2 W.V.R. 212 (Man. C.A.); Re Family
and Child ServiceAct (1982), (B.C. Prov. Ct) [unreported] cited in Carasco, supra, note 5 at 128; and
Simeonoffv. J.A. (14 February 1992), Vancouver CA011869 (B.C.C.A.) arguing that the
entire thrust of the custody provisions of the [B.C. Family Relations] Act is towards [a] person
to person relationship ... In its simplest, organic form a tribe is an agglomeration of individuals
like a congregation or a club. Regardless of the nature of the tie that binds the members
together, the notion that such a group can be regarded as an individual for purposes of child
custody is entirely foreign to the concept of custody and to the individual duties and
responsibilities implicit in the concept.
152 (19 April 1988), Kenora C102/85 (Ont. Prov. Ct Fain. Div.), Little J. [unreported]
[hereinafter Kenora-Patricia v. Rose F. ].
153 S.O. 1984, c. 55, as am. S.O. 1990, c. C-11, s. 57(5).
154 Kenora-Patricia v. Rose F., supra, note 152 (emphasis added).
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The order of costs in this case was clearly meant to discourage bands
who wish to advance their collective concerns in First Nations child
welfare proceedings.
The judicial approach in child welfare proceedings has also made
it difficult for provincial governments and government officials to
respond to the First Nations child welfare crisis with decisions and
policies that take account of the collective interests of First Nations
generally or of particular bands.155 In N.P.P. v. Regional Children's
Guardian,15 6 white foster parents of a nine-year-old Cree child who had
been in their care for three years applied for certiorari to quash the
refusal by the Regional Children's Guardian to consent to their private
guardianship order. Instead, the Guardian had decided to place the
child with her aunt on her mother's reserve in northern Saskatchewan.
This case was the first time a decision of the Regional Children's
Guardian of Alberta had been challenged in the courts since the
creation of the position in 1984j57 The Alberta Court of Queen's Bench
allowed the application for judicial review on the basis that the Guardian
had wrongly interpreted the purpose of the Alberta Child Welfare Act
respecting First Nations children in care.
The Regional Children's Guardian had interpreted the Act as
requiring her to place First Nations children receiving care from non-
First Nations foster parents, if at all possible, in a First Nations home in
the particular band from which the child's mother or parents came.158
The judge, however, narrowly construed the relevant sections of the Act
and concluded that the Guardian's approach constituted an error of law.
For example, he. rejected the Guardian's construction of the word
"family" in section 2(a) of the Act as including members of a band who
share a common ancestry and insisted that "family" included only that
group of people who, before intervention by the state, had been
responsible for the care and supervision of a child.159 Thus, since the
child in question had been originally apprehended from the custody of
155 See infra, Section IV for a more extensive consideration of legislative reform efforts in
Alberta.
15 6 Supra, note 115.
15 7AlbertaAct, 1984. See also discussion, infra, notes 195-98 and accompanying text.
158 N.P.P., supra, note 115 at 74.
159 Compare Re EJ.C., supra, note 116 at 128, where the centrality of the extended family in
Cree social structure is recognized and incorporated into the statutory reference to "family."
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her mother, the maintenance of family ties as required by section 2(a)
was held not to require the maintenance of ties between the child and an
aunt, let alone more distantly related members of her band.
The Guardian had also interpreted a provision emphasizing
placement of a child "as close as possible to the child's home
community"160 to mean placement on the particular reserve from which
the child's mother had come and on which her aunt and one brother
lived. The judge's view, however, was that the phrase meant only the
physical community in which the child had lived prior to state
intervention. On the basis of this interpretation, the Court concluded
that it was incorrect to say that the "home community" of the individual
child was the reserve. According to Macdonald A.C.J., "there [was] no
indication whatever ... that the reserve in Saskatchewan was the home of
the child at the time of apprehension," nor could the reserve be
considered the mother's home community since she had not lived there
for many years.161  This case places important constraints on
administrative officials attempting to address the collective concerns of
First Nations regarding the placement of First Nations children.
2. The "innocence" of law: child welfare law as impartial and universal
My analysis up to this point has sought to explain how the
alarmingly disproportionate impact of the child welfare. system is
attributable, at least in part, to the legal form of the best interests
standard. This has illustrated one of the subtle ways in which racism
operates in the context of law. Now I want to turn to an examination of
how this legal form also contributes to a portrayal of the child welfare
process as innocent of its disparate and destructive effects on First
Nations-an example of what Peter Fitzpatrick refers to as the
"innocence" of law relating to racism 62 Within the liberal, ideological
form of the best interests of the child standard, racism is rarely explicit.
Instead, the form of law "both substitutes for explicit racism and
provides a means of asserting that what is involved is not racism but
160 Alberta Act, 1984, s. 2(h)(iii).
161 N.P.P., supra, note 115 at 75.
162 Fitzpatrick, "Innocence of Law," supra, note 61 at 121.
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something different." 163 Thus, law remains not only compatible with
racism, but is also a mechanism for its reproduction and reinforcement.
"[B]y taking elements of racism into itself and shaping them in its own
terms,"164 the particular form of law establishes "limits beyond which
law will not proceed"165 in addressing or countering racism. In the end,
law's claim of innocence obfuscates its role in the reproduction and
reinforcement of racism, thereby rendering its racist structures
unassailable. 166
These general insights into the relationship between racism and
liberal legality have important bearing on this analysis of the operation
of the best interests principle in the context of First. Nations child
welfare. Here the innocence of law is expressed in terms of the
impartiality of the best interests of the child standard-impartiality
being a crucial presupposition of liberal legality. The portrayal of law as
impartial ensures that it appears innocent of politics, thereby reinforcing
its claim to legitimacy. This impartiality is premised upon universality of
application: if the law applies equally to everybody, then it must be
impartial.167 In the context of child welfare law, universality is manifest
in the application of the same standards and protective mechanisms
established in child welfare legislation to all children within each
province. The "universalistic pretensions"1 8 of child welfare law, in
turn, support the putative objectivity of the child welfare system. 169 The
system is thus constructed as innocent of the disparate impact and
destructive effects that it has had on First Nations.170 Moreover,
universality establishes a particular identity of law that submerges
acknowledgement and recognition of unequal power relations between
various groups in society. It presumes from the outset the "unity of
163 bid. at 120.
164 /Ibid. at 122.
165bid.
166 Ibid. Fitzpatrick illustrates and supports this argument through an analysis of the
operation of the British Race Relations Act 1976 (U.K.), 1976, c. 74.
167 bid. at 130.
168 Ibid. at 129.
169 For a similar observation in relation to racism and law in other contexts, see Kobayashi,
supra, note 64 at 451.
170 Seesupra, notes 3-4 and accompanying text.
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society and nation" 171 that serves to obscure material relations of
conflict and oppression.
The "universalistic pretensions" of courts in applying the best
interests standard are illustrated by a recent decision of the Supreme
Court of Nova Scotia Appeal Division. In M.K.S. v. Minister of
Community Services (Nova Scotia),172 a Micmac woman challenged a
finding that her two children were in need of protection. She argued
under section 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms173 that
she had been discriminated against on the basis of race or ethnic origin,
family status, and economic status. In evidence, she submitted a number
of studies, characterized by the Court as dealing with the "social-
economic problems of native people," 174 and a federal government
report demonstrating the disproportionate impact of child welfare law
on First Nations children. 17S Palmeter C.J.C.C. acknowledged that the
relevant section of the Children's Services Act "may have a greater impact
on native people,"176 but concluded that the "test for children 'in eed of
protection' [was] standard throughout the province" and "applied
equally to all persons."177  Thus, in his view, there was no
discrimination.178
171 Fitzpatrick, "Innocence of Law," supra, note 61 at 129. See also C. Sumner, Reading
Ideologies: An Investigation into the Marxist Theory of Ideology and Law (London: Academic Press,
1979) at 293 (arguing that law through its universalistie pretensions provides the "expression of
unity in the nation."); E. Lawrence, "Just plain common sense: the 'roots' of racism" in Centre for
Contemporary Cultural Studies, ed., The Empire Strikes Back- Race and Racism in 70s Britain
(London: Hutchinson & Co., 1982) 47 at 59 (arguing that the notion of nation is itself an
ideological construction which contributes to the binding of disparate groups in society).
172 (1988), 86 N.S.R. (2d) 209, [1990] 1 C.N.LR. 53 (N.S. Co. Ct), aff'd [1990] 1 C.N.LR. 87
(N.S.S.C.A.D.) [hereinafter MKS. cited to N.S.R.].
173 Part I of the ConstitutionAct 1982, being Schedule B of the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982,
c. 11 [hereinafter Charter].
174MKS., supra, note 172 at 223.
175 ]bid at 222-23.
176 Ibid. at 223.
1 7 7 Ibid.
178 Given that there was strong evidence of physical abuse of the children in question, this was
not a case with a particularly good factual basis for supporting a Charter challenge: D.A.R.
Thompson, "Why Hasn't the Charter Mattered in Child Protection?" (1989-90) 8 Can. J. Fain. L.
133 at 136 and at 140. Nonetheless, it illustrates the judicial construction of child welfare law as
impartial as a result of its universal application.
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Evidence of the systemic impact of child welfare law was
similarly ignored in Re Cherie M179 A First Nations mother, seeking the
return of her daughter whom she had voluntarily placed into state care
some months earlier, called as a witness an expert on child welfare. On
the basis of a summary of facts provided to him in a letter prior to the
trial, the expert had concluded that "it seem[ed] fairly clear to [him] ...
that the 'system' ha[d] through close contact with this kind of work, lost
some of its immediate sensitivity with regard to the removal of children
from their family."180 Because the expert had discussed the system in
general as opposed to the specific circumstances of the particular case
before him and had had "no direct contact with the mother, the child or
the child welfare workers involved in the case,"181 the Court declined to
give weight to this evidence. Moreover, according to the Court, the
expert's evidence lacked "the neutrality and objectivity that should have
been displayed."18 2 The judge characterized the views of the expert as
follows:
The thesis of Dr. Bagley as it relates to child welfare and children of native origin is that
by and large intervention by child welfare in native families has done more harm than
good. According to Dr. Bagley, all kinds of alternatives should be considered before
apprehension or ward care, and in his opinion, as an expert in child welfare, "the grounds
for apprehending are extremely slender."
1 8 3
According to the Court, Dr. Bagley's testimony and other similar
materials "relating to child welfare in general and child welfare and the
native community" were "of little assistance ... in conducting this
inquiry."184 The Court's only "duty" was "to inquire into and ascertain
the facts of the case, and then apply the law as found in the existing
Child Welfare Act and the authorities."185
The implication in Re Cherie M. is that concerns about the
systemic impact of the child welfare system are related to policy and
therefore not "neutral," while concerns about the best interests of
1 7 9 Supra, note 123.
180 Ibid. at 52.
181 Ibid
182 Ibid.
183 Ibid
184 Ibi
185 Ibi
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individual children are legal, and thus innocent of politics. This point is
further illustrated in Pitzel v. Children's Aid Society of Winnipeg.186
Anishnaabe Child and Family Services, a First Nations-controlled child
welfare agency in Manitoba, applied to intervene in an action addressing
the guardianship of a three-and-a-half-year-old child who had been
apprehended and placed in the care of foster parents nine days after her
birth. The agency had become actively involved in the case with a view
to placing the child with her maternal aunt on a reserve. The foster
parents, who wanted to adopt the child, opposed Anishnaabe's
application for intervenor status. They felt that the agency's
involvement would " 'politicize' the case."' 187 The Court granted the
agency intervenor status and answered the foster parents argument by
asserting that it would not allow the case to be "politicized"; rather, it
would "confine all parties to the one and only issue-the arrangement
that will best serve the needs of the child."188 In other words, by
confining arguments to the child's best interests, the case could not be
politicized. Once again, then, the best interests standard is set up as
apolitical-as "innocent" of politics.189
186 Supra, note 151.
187 ibid. at 477.
1881Ibid.
189 Another interesting example of the purported separation of child welfare law from politics
can be found in North West Child and Family Services Agency v. B.S. (1988), 52 Man. R. (2d) 254
(Q.B.). The Court's rejection of a First Nations-controlled child and family services agency's
argument that the Court's decision might have undesirable political consequences for the agency
was reinforced by its implication that the best interests standard and its application thereof were,
unlike the agency's practices, above political considerations.
[voL 30 No. 2
Child Welfare Law
IV. THE POWER OF BEST INTERESTS IDEOLOGY AND
LEGISLATIVE REFORM
Child welfare law has been portrayed as impartial and apolitical.
Yet, this portrayal has not completely obscured its disparate impact on
First Nations. By the late 1970s, the destructive effects of the child
welfare system on First Nations were being brought to public light
through the lobbying efforts of First Nations, in particular First Nations
women's organizations.1 90 Demands for legislative change by First
Nations and other critics over the past decade have often included
recommendations for modification of the best interests standard, and
some of these have been adopted in recent legislative reforms.19 1 The
recent nature of such modifications makes it difficult to properly assess
their impact. However, my analysis provides a useful starting point for
understanding their potential impact and for developing other
transformative strategies in the future. Most importantly, I want to
suggest that the power and resilience of best interests ideology may serve
to undermine attempts to avoid its destructive effects through legislative
reform. Recent experience in Alberta provides a good example of this
problem.
Around the time First Nations began to lobby for change to the
child welfare system in Alberta, the government initiated an examination
of the underlying premises and structures of existing child welfare
legislation.1 92 First Nations organizations became involved in this
process to ensure that any resulting legislation would be responsive to
their concerns, although they also continued to pursue other strategies
190 For example, three resolutions were passed by the Ontario Native Women's Association in
July 1981 addressing child welfare issues as a priority: see Native People's Resource Centre, supra,
note 11 at 44-45. See also Native Women's Association of Canada, "Our Children are Our Future"
(Presentation to the Special House Committee on Child Care, 10 June 1986); and Monture, supra,
note 4 at 5 and at 8 discussing the centrality of children's issues for First Nations women.
191 E.g., Alberta, Ontario, Saskatchewan, Nova Scotia, and the current Child Protection
Legislation Review process in British Columbia.
192 Alberta, Court of Queen's Bench, Board of Review: The Child Welfare System (Edmonton:
Court of Queen's Bench, 20 October 1983) (Chair: J.C. Cavanagh); and RJ. Thomlison, Case
Management Review: Northwest Region, Department of Social Services and Community Health
(Edmonton: Alberta Department of Social Services and Community Health, Northwest Region,
September 1984).
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of child welfare reform1 3 Within the consultative process, they and
numerous others194 criticized the broad discretion afforded to agency
workers and judges under the best interests standard. They
recommended legislative circumscription of this discretion through the
introduction of specific criteria to be considered in the determination of
any care disposition.
Partly in response to such recommendations, new legislation
which provided a more specific formulation of what had previously been
a general and undefined best interests standard was drafted and
assented to in 1984.195 Most importantly, the general best interests of
the child standard was not established as an overriding consideration.
Instead, the revised Act began with an extensive list of specific
considerations that any court or person exercising decision-making
power under the Act was required to take into account.196 That "the
interests of the child" be "recognized and protected" was included only
as one of the listed considerations.19 7 Also explicitly required in "any
decision concerning the removal of a child from the child's family" was
consideration of "the benefits to the child of maintaining, wherever
possible, the child's familial, cultural, social and religious heritage."198
Finally, in response to failings in the case management processes of the
Ministry of Family and Social Services, the Act created a new
193 See FinalReport, supra, note 6 at app. 4; and James, supra, note 12.
194 A parallel critique of interventionist child welfare legislation was inspired by the work of
American academics: see M. Wald, "State Intervention on Behalf of 'Neglected' Children: A
Search for Realistic Standards" (1975) 27 Stan. L Rev. 985; M. Wald, "State Intervention on Behalf
of 'Neglected' Children: Standards for Removal of Children from their Homes, Monitoring the
Status of Children in Foster Care, and Termination of Parental Rights" (1976) 28 Stan. L Rev. 623;
R.H. Mnookin, "Foster Care-In Whose Best Interest?" (1973) 43 Harv. Educ. Rev. 599; J.
Goldstein, A. Freud & A.J. Solnit, Beyond the Best Interests of the Child (New York: Free Press,
1973); and J. Goldstein, A. Freud & A.J. Solnit, Before the Best Interests of the Child (New York:
Free Press, 1979).
195 Alberta Act, 1984. The previous Alberta legislation, R.S-A. 1980, c. C-8, had set out the
best interests of the child as the fundamental consideration and did not specify in any way what was
meant by that principle.
196 Ibid. at s. 2.
197Ibid. at s. 2(b).
1981Ibid. at s. 2(f)(i).
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administrative position to perform an advocacy, as opposed to an
administrative, role in relation to children in state care.1 9
The absence of a mandatory and general best interests standard
in the new legislation became a source of considerable controversy in its
subsequent implementation. The question of interpreting the modified
guidelines first arose in the context of judicial review of decisions made
by the Children's Guardian relating to First Nations children in care.
Soon after being appointed, the new Children's Guardian had developed
and implemented a policy designed to find permanent homes for First
Nations children who were in the long-term, temporary care of the
Director.200 Under this policy; over two hundred First Nations children
were returned successfully to the homes of their parents or extended
families.20 1 However, controversy arose in relation to a few difficult
cases in which non-First Nations foster parents challenged the removal
of their foster children. Decisions in their favour by the Child Welfare
Appeal panel were subsequently overturned by the Children's Guardian.
In two such cases, the foster parents then applied to the Court of
Queen's Bench for review of the Guardian's decision.2 °2 The Court
quashed the decision of the Children's Guardian in one case, N.P.P. ,203
and, in the course of its reasons, drew critical attention to the absence of
an overriding best interests of the child principle in the Child Welfare
199 This new position was called the Children's Guardian. See Alberta, Legislative Assembly,
Hansard (8 May 1984) at 757.
200 When asked in the Legislative Assembly to comment on the policy of "taking as many
native children as possible back to the reserves," Connie Osterman, Minister of Social Services,
replied that there was and had never been such a policy. Rather, there was a general concern to
find permanent homes for the large number of children who had been in long-term, temporary care,
which might involve either private adoption in favour of foster parents or the return of a child to a
First Nations community. In her view, that had been achieved quite successfully except for "a small
number of cases ... that ha[d] not been achieved with concurrence on both sides." Alberta,
Legislative Assembly, Hansard (23 March 1988) at 71-72.
201 See G. Koch, "Trying to end the nightmares: Alberta and Manitoba confront failed native
child 'repatriation' policies" Western Report (7 November 1988) 8. This information could not be
verified because the Alberta Ministry of Family and Social Services does not keep a record of the
number of First Nations children in state care successfully returned to their communities.
Telephone interview with Archie Arcan, Manager of the Child Welfare Information System,
Alberta Ministry of Family and Social Services (7 August 1992).
202 N.P.P., supra, note 115; and Tschritterv. Sohn (1987), 83 A.R. 374 (Q.B.).
2 03 Supra, note 115 and accompanying text.
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Act.204 Media reports of this case, along with similar arguments from
foster parents' advocacy groups, heightened public concern that the best
interests of the individual First Nations children who were being
returned to First Nations communities were not being met? 05 Questions
posed in the Legislative Assembly relating to the "repatriation"
controversies were met with assertions by the government that all
decisions had been, and continued to be, made in accordance with the
best interests of the individual children in question.206 Ultimately, the
government bowed to political pressure by amending the Child Welfare
Act to reinstate the best interests of the child standard as an overriding
principle and to curtail the broad-ranging powers of the Children's
Guardian 207
2 04 See N.P.P., supra, note 115 at 65-66:
The list of considerations set forth in s. 2 does not state that the governing consideration is
"the best interests of the child," which before the enactment of the 1984 Act had been
regarded as the fundamental consideration. The omission is startling and must be regarded as
significant ... Its significance must be that, the legislature having taken the trouble to enact a
list of relevant considerations, that list cannot be read as subject to some unstated overriding
principle that is neither stated as overriding nor even mentioned as one of the relevant
considerations.
See also Re C.W.L.L (1986), 74 A.R. 395, 5 R.F.L. (3d) 53 (Q.B.) where the Court relied on
Racine supra, note 57, and Kng; supra, note 57, to read an overriding best interests of the child
principle into the AlbertaAct, notwithstanding its absence. Paying particular attention to those
matters mentioned in s. 2(h) of theAct, the Court concluded that the best interests principle ought
to have governed in deciding whether to return the child in question to the mother or to order
permanent guardianship.
205 See, eg., J. Cote & T. Philip, "Fostering Heartbreak" Western Report (11 May 1984) 37;
Koch, supra, note 201; and Alberta, Legislative Assembly, Hansard (24 March 1988) at 91.
206 See, eg., Alberta, Legislative Assembly, Hansard (23 March 1988) at 71; Alberta,
Legislative Assembly, Hansard (24 March 1988) at 92 (Osterman: "I believe there are many
processes in place that speak to the best interests of the child, and they are being followed.");
Alberta, Legislative Assembly, Hansard (21 April 1988) at 576 (Osterman: "certainly the
[permanency planning] policy has to speak to the best interests of the child and not the various
adults who have wishes to make a permanent home for that child."; and further down: "[I]n all
instances-and it's certainly the direction from the minister and the deputy minister and senior
staff-the needs of the child must come first and foremost."); and Alberta, Legislative Assembly,
Hansard (20 June 1988) at 1846 (Osterman: "I think we do have to make a definitive statement
about our policy in respect to what interests are to come first and foremost [regarding First Nations
children], and it is the interests of the individual children.")
2 07 Child Welfare AmendmentAc4 1988, S.A. 1988, c. 15, reported by the Legislative Assembly
of Alberta on 5 July 1988. See Alberta, Legislative Assembly, Hansard (30 June 1988) at 2172, in
regard to the re-instatement of the best interests standard in the Amendment Act, Osterman
observes that "obviously, inherent throughout the Bill, that had always been there. But it was
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This chain of events demonstrates the strength and resilience of
best interests ideology. The original legislative amendments sought to
address the First Nations child welfare crisis by, among other things,
removing the general best interests standard from the child welfare
legislation and creating a child advocate position. The amendments had
significant positive effects in that large numbers of First Nations children
were returned to their communities. However, these reforms were
finally legislatively derailed. I want to suggest that this can be
understood in part as a consequence of the continuing power of best
interests ideology. While the amendments were a significant victory for
First Nations, they were, nonetheless, a fragile and incomplete victory.
Without a more direct transformation of the material conditions that
gave rise to the development of best interests ideology, even explicit
legislative action could not significantly challenge its power and tenacity
in the minds of both judges and members of the public.
V. CONCLUSION
Liberalism has structured legal discourse such that racism is most
often unintended and rarely explicit. To understand how and why law in
its various aspects has an oppressive and discriminatory impact on First
Nations and other racialized groups in Canadian society, one must look
at some of its more subtle processes and, in particular, its ideological
form. My goal in this article has been to provide some insight into the
origins and operation of best interests of the child ideology and to
illustrate how it structures and constrains judicial decision making in the
context of First Nations child welfare. Best interests of the child
ideology manifests the basic tenets of liberal ideology. In child welfare
cases, this has served to portray the apprehension and placement of First
Nations children away from their families and communities as natural,
necessary, and legitimate, rather than coercive and destructive. This is
accomplished, in part, through legal processes that appear to be
universal and neutral, and to protect children and serve their best
interests. As well, the relevance and importance of a First Nations child
maintaining her First Nations identity and culture is minimized. As a
result, I have argued, child welfare law has become a new modality of
important in terms of the way the situation had been addressed in a legal sense to do that."
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colonialist regulation of First Nations in the post-Second World War
period.
Since best interests ideology has had such a destructive impact
on First Nations in the context of child welfare, understanding its nature
and operation is crucial in developing effective strategies to address and
counter the continuing crisis. At a minimum, the power and effects of
best interests ideology in this context should raise concern about any
child welfare regime that maintains the best interests standard as central.
However, the unsuccessful attempt in Alberta to avoid the power of best
interests ideology demonstrates that more needs to be done than simply
eliminating explicit legislative requirements to render decisions
according to the best interests standard. A number of First Nations
child welfare cases have chipped away at assumptions implicit in best
interests ideology, but ideology cannot be countered simply through
arguments that its assumptions are false or incorrect. To transform
ideology substantially, it is necessary to work on changing the material
conditions and power relations responsible for its production and
reproduction.
In the child welfare context, this means addressing directly the
power accorded to institutions of the dominant society to impose
destructive child welfare regimes on First Nations in the first place. First
Nations must be empowered, financially, politically, and otherwise, to
develop their own child welfare services outside the framework of
existing provincial legislative schemes. This approach would be
consistent with the current, long-term strategies of many First Nations
communities which are developing child welfare services with the more
general goal of self-government 208 Autonomous First Nations child
208 See T. Isaac, "Justice for Whom?"Akwesasne Notes [Rooseveltown, New York] (Early Fall
1988) 27; and Esse Networks Ltd., Together Today ... For Our Children Tomorrow: Our Most
Valuable Resource: A Discussion of Indian Child Welfare (Yukon Territories: Council for Yukon'
Indians, October 1990). See also the recommendations of the Aboriginal portion of the Community
Panel established in November 1991 by the Ministry of Social Services in British Columbia to review
child protection legislation stating that:
[t]he first step to righting the wrongs which have been done to us is to limit the authority to
interfere in the lives of our families, and to provide remedies other than the removal of our
children from our Nations. This must be accompanied by the financial resources which we
require to heal the wounds inflicted upon us. At the same time, the responsibilities and
jurisdictions vested in your Superintendent and the family courts must be vested in our
Nations. Finally, as our Nations rewrite their own family law to meet our contemporary needs,
as we rebuild the authority usurped from our Nations, the laws of our Nations must have
paramountcy over your laws as they apply to our people.
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welfare services, however, will not in themselves be enough. It is
necessary as well to challenge (as First Nations are presently doing) the
historical and continuing colonialist practices of exclusion, land
dispossession, and destruction of traditional First Nations economies.
These have resulted in the conditions of poverty, ill-health, and alcohol
and drug dependency that, in turn, create much of the need for
supportive or substitutional care for First Nations children. Ultimately,
then, the welfare of First Nations children cannot be separated from the
more general welfare of First Nations. The current crisis in First
Nations child welfare will only be effectively resolved if addressed in
conjunction with the wider and intersecting social, economic, and
political goals of First Nations.
See also A.S. Pellatt, An InternationalReview of Child Welfare Policy and Practice in Relation to
Aboriginal People (Calgary: Canadian Research Institute for Law and the Family, 1991) at 5-30;
Warty, supra, note 3 at 31 and at 33; Macdonald, supra, note 4 (describing a particularly interesting
initiative of the Spallumcheen Indian Band of British Columbia in 1980 to address the child welfare
crisis in its own community and develop autonomous, community-based services which involved
passage of a by-law assigning exclusive jurisdiction over custody proceedings involving Band
children to the Band); B. Wharf, Toward First Nation Control of Child Welfare: A Review of
Emerging Developments in B.C. (Victoria: University of Victoria, 1989); and R.S. Ratner, Child
Welfare Services for Urban Native Indians (Vancouver: United Native Nations, 1990).
1992]

